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ABSTRACT
Liberia has become the quintessential example of an African failed state. Though Liberia’s civil
war is officially over, war criminals are free and some are even helping run the transitional
government under the authority of Liberia’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). This
peace agreement calls for the consideration of a general amnesty for those involved in the
Liberian civil war alongside the parceling of governmental functions among members of various
rebel groups. The drafters of the agreement claim that this was the only viable solution for
sustainable peace in Liberia. Meanwhile, Charles Taylor relaxes in Nigeria’s resort city of
Calabar. To contrast Liberia, Sierra Leone took the brave step of implementing the Special
Court for Sierra Leone when it realized that its peace agreement-which had similar goals and
structure to Liberia’s- was a failure. Sierra Leone’s decision signals a desire to begin the
transition to rule of law and the end of rule by impunity. Sierra Leone can be a model for
Liberia. This Comment revisits the colonial period in Liberia to track the growth of a culture of
impunity. This rule by Liberian elites, without answering to their own people, has directly
caused a failure of the Liberian state. I suggest that a Special Court for Liberia, instead of less
punitive transitional mechanisms, would create a hands-on approach to building the respect for a
tradition of rule of law and justice in a country that lacks such a tradition. If the intervention of
the transitional government of Liberia and the international community is at the level of the
exercise of elite power instead of at the level of reconciliation among the masses (which is where
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement focuses its energies)-through the use of punitive
mechanisms such as prosecution in a hybrid court of law, Liberia can begin to end the culture of
impunity and ring in a sustainable peace. In pursuing this goal of the implementation of the
Special Court for Liberia, the CPA would need to be revised to reflect the concerns expressed in
this Comment. Primarily, a revised CPA must reject amnesty for war crimes and crimes against
humanity as was done in Sierra Leone.

Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California Berkeley, J.D. 2005. The thought to right on transitional
justice in Liberia came to me while I externed in the chambers of Judge Terry Hatter Jr., US District Judge, Central
District of California. This was the summer that Charles Taylor departed Liberia. My thoughts on all of the issues
that arose after that summer of 2003 are in this paper. I would like to thank the following people for inspiration,
guidance, and hard work in getting this piece together: David K. Leonard, Dean of Inter Area Studies U.C.
Berkeley, Angela Harris, Professor of Law Boalt Hall School of Law, and Kathleen Savage.
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INTRODUCTION
Liberia is the classic portrait of a failed state. 1 Today, Liberia is one of the world’s
poorest countries. According to World Bank indicators, 46% of its population is below the
poverty line compared to 37% for the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa; the population of Liberia is
generally undereducated, with a literacy rate of 44.1%; and Liberia faces a debt that cannot be
realistically repaid.2 Two civil wars have left an estimated 200,000 people dead, created at least
250,000 new refugees, and displaced approximately 350,0003. This state of affairs did not arise
overnight, and contrary to popular opinion, Liberia’s situation is not a result of deep rooted
ethnic hatred or poverty. These are only some of the symptoms of a bigger disease: the deadly
effects of African governance in general and the Liberian culture of impunity in particular.
The development community seems to have missed the historical lesson of the impact of
colonialism on the post-colonial state by pretending that Band-aid measures such as
“democracy”, development, and human rights promotion alone will cure all of the problems that
plague failed and weak states in Africa.4 Yet, the reality is that states in Africa will not function
properly until elites are held accountable, i.e. encouraged to rule over citizens rather than

1

JOHN-PETER PHAM, LIBERIA: PORTRAIT OF A FAILED STATE 224 (2004).
World Bank, Liberia at a Glance (2004) at http://worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/lbr_aag.pdf. (last visited
March 7, 2005).
3
STEPHEN ELLIS, THE MASK OF ANARCHY: THE DESTRUCTION OF LIBERIA AND THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF AN
AFRICAN CIVIL WAR 315 (1999); Human Rights Watch, World Report 2003: Liberia (2003) 48 at
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/africa7.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2005) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch, World Report
2003: Liberia (2003)]; CLIFF BERNATH & SARAH MARTIN, PEACEKEEPING IN WEST AFRICA: A WORLD REPORT 3
(Refugees International 2004), available at http://www.refintl.org/files/2992_file_PK_WestAfrica_Jun04_v2.pdf
(last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
4
The development community continues to insist on the promotion of the rule of law, democracy, and human rights
promotion in exchange for aid. But African leaders do not necessarily follow through on their declarations to work
towards these goals. As an alternative, David Leonard argues that Africa is in need of “effective development
management” instead of more aid. DAVID K. LEONARD & SCOTT STRAUS, AFRICA’S STALLED DEVELOPMENT:
INTERNATIONAL CAUSES & CURES 37-38 (2003). Achieving this effective development management involves four
different types of management behavior—public policymaking, organizational leadership, internal administration,
and bureaucratic hygiene. Id.
2
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subjects. Therefore, the project of democracy has to take a critical look at the culture of
impunity that has become characteristic of African governance since decolonization.
Instead, the dominant theme of late for addressing post-conflict rebuilding in African
states has been one of protracted diplomacy. 5 Leonard Robinson, President of the Africa
Society, recently suggested that ending conflict requires “patience, fortitude, understanding, the
difficult skill of neutrality, and critically important, it requires that all parties negotiate in good
faith.” 6 In this same diplomatic spirit, commentators on Liberia’s most recent Accra Peace
Agreement [Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA], which formally ended the Liberian civil
war and introduced the National Transition Government of Liberia, claim that this document has
been a diplomatic effort to end Liberia’s fourteen-year civil war.7 The same policy makers claim
that the departure of Charles Taylor from Liberia signals the beginning of peace in Liberia.8
Yet, curiously, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement has not dedicated itself to
addressing issues of elite-sponsored violence in Liberia. In fact, the Liberian peace agreement
recommends the consideration of a general amnesty for all those involved in Liberia’s civil
wars9, which raises important issues about Liberia’s choice to privilege diplomacy over legal
sanction of state-sponsored violence.

The necessity of a quick peace at the expense of a

5

See, e.g., Symposium, State Reconstruction After Civil Conflict, 95 AM J. INT’L L. 1 (2001) (noting that after the
Second World War, internal conflicts usually end by negotiation and concession, not by conquest or unconditional
surrender); Interview by Robert Siegel & Michele Norris (National Public Radio) with Jacques Paul Klein, UN
Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Liberia, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 18, 2003) (describing the efforts of
the Nigerian government to force Charles Taylor to obey the conditions of his exile in Calabar).
6
Leonard H. Robinson, Jr., The Role of Diplomacy in African Conflict Resolution: The Case of Liberia in Context,
19 MILLER CENTER REPORT 28, 28-32, (2003).
7
See, e.g., National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, War Is Behind Us Now: A Report On Focus
Group Research in Liberia 6, 9 (2004) at http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/1769_lr_war_100104.pdf; U.S.
Policy Toward Liberia: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives, 108th Cong. 40 (2003) (statement of Nohn Kidau, President, Movement for Democratic
Change in Liberia) [hereinafter U.S. Policy Toward Liberia (statement)].
8
Id.
9
Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation
and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties, August 18,
2003, art. XXXIV, at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia_08182003_toc.html [hereinafter CPA and Accra
Peace to refer to this document]
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sustained movement towards a culture free from the incessant cruelty of elite politics ensures that
Liberia will not be an emblem of stability for West Africa in the future. Given Liberia’s past
potential for this status, this state of affairs is sad,to say the least.
Liberia’s choice, however, was not made in a political vacuum.

The international

community and its persistent emphasis on light-handed and diplomatic peace measures has a
great impact on Liberia’s peace process. 10

In this vein, I argue that the international

community’s emphasis on transitional mechanisms that focus on diplomatic measures and
measures concentrating on the general populations of conflict states, rather than mechanisms that
focus on swift justice through the use of criminal tribunals, places too much responsibility on
Liberians in general and not enough blame on the elite power structure in Liberia in particular.
Focusing on these non-punitive transitional mechanisms that grant blanket amnesties to
dangerous characters either denies or ignores the historical, political, and economic events that
led to Liberia’s status as a failed state. The international community and the transitional leaders
in Liberia have allowed for a post-conflict situation where the route to peace is completely
divorced from history. A discussion of the rebuilding of a failed state like Liberia can only take
place when leaders are candid about the nature of colonial rule, the type of rule resulting from
colonial domination, and the complete failure of African leaders to be accountable for their
behavior.

During post-conflict rebuilding, the injustice that results is that violence will

ultimately begin anew.
In contrast to Liberia, Sierra Leone, Liberia’s neighbor, once had a similar agreement but
quickly realized the grave problems with granting a blanket amnesty to high-level criminals.
Instead of granting a blanket amnesty to war criminals in Sierra Leone, the government created
10

See generally, Survivor’s Rights International, SRI Country Briefing: Liberia 22 (2003) (supporting the CPA’s
proposed creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and National Commission on Human Rights) at
http://www.survivorsrightsinternational.org/pdfs/Liberia_report.pdf [hereinafter SRI Country Briefing: Liberia].
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the Special Court for Sierra Leone to try those individuals most responsible for war crimes and
for the looting of the Sierra Leonean state.11 Sierra Leone’s choice to privilege justice over
diplomacy is a clear sign of that country’s realization of the need to end the culture of impunity
in Sierra Leone. Liberia, however, has decided to continue with the status quo of impunity while
paying lip service to democratic goals.12 This will only contribute to the culture of impunity that
has existed in Liberia for years; Liberia is a failed state precisely because elite-sponsored
violence continues to cause perpetual insecurity in Liberia.
Sierra Leone’s approach to justice, through its creation of a Special Court for Sierra
Leone (SCSL)13 seems an apt model for Liberia given the similarities between the two countries.
I suggest that Liberia and the international community must realize two things on the road to
Liberia’s reconstruction. First, pursuing a justice that addresses the causes of the weak state
phenomena in Liberia is a crucial step on the way to peace. This type of justice must deal
specifically with crimes committed by Liberian elites and other higher-up officials instead of
focusing on those who carried out the atrocities. Second, peace (and when I use this term I mean
simply the existence of a secure society evidenced by a long-term cessation of state sponsored
violence and the delivery of political goods to the people inhabiting the borders within), can be
an achievable goal through the use of legal mechanisms that promote accountability.
Recognizing that emphasis on justice without equal commitments of military, political,
and economic resources undermines the project of democracy, this Comment considers the
11

See generally, website for the Special Court for Sierra Leone at http://www.sc-sl.org/frontpage.html (last visited
Mar. 19, 2004); Compare Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,
U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000) (insisting that the amnesty provision in the Lome Peace Agreement cannot be granted
in respect of international crimes), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/sgrep00.htm. [hereinafter
Secretary General Report S/2000/915] with Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, art. IX, July 7, 1999, available at
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierra_leone_07071999_toc.html (calling for a general amnesty) [hereinafter Lome
Accord].
12
See generally, CPA, supra note 9.
13
Secretary-General Report S/2000/915, supra note 11.
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particular contribution of justice to post-conflict peace building in Liberia. Part I provides a
background for the Liberian crisis and puts Liberia’s history and the two most recent civil wars
into context. It also shows the similarities between Liberia’s and Sierra Leone’s conflicts. By
providing a brief history of Liberia and its civil wars, Part II explains the emergence of the
culture of impunity which has brought about the failure of Liberia as a modern state. In
particular, I suggest that Liberia has failed at protecting its people from insecurity precisely
because these same elites benefit from a continuous insecurity and instability; for it is through
the promotion of civil war that elites can enjoy the fruits of civil war. After describing the two
peace agreements that ended the wars of Sierra Leone and Liberia respectively, highlighting the
positive aspects and flaws of these peace agreements, I argue that the peace agreement approach
to ending civil wars and transitioning to functioning states is inappropriate for countries like
Liberia. The major flaw in Liberia’s peace agreement is its failure to address elite- sponsored
violence and its granting of a general amnesty to all the perpetrators of violence. In fact, the
peace agreement will not only be a historical failure but a sure recipe for renewed hostility and
the perpetuation of the culture of impunity.
In Part III, I argue that an approach based on principles of justice, like the approach
pursued in Sierra Leone, would be more appropriate. I explain the framework of the SCSL14 and
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that have been set up in Sierra Leone.15 In
Liberia, no court has been alluded to and the transitional government of Liberia missed the
opportunity to learn from the Sierra Leone negotiation process. Still, it may not be too late to
hold some important figures accountable. The current transitional government might call for this
approach or the incoming administration in 2005. In discussing the absolute necessity of a

14
15

Id. at 21.
Lome Accord, art. VI, supra note 11.
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special court, I address a likely critique: that legal mechanisms such as trials do not consider the
delicate political situation of transitional societies or other possible routes to peace and
reconciliation. As a preliminary response, I suggest that the failure of this critique is that it
completely ignores the impact of colonialism on African governance and that the point of
intervention of non-legal mechanisms- the masses or the victims of civil wars- allows elites to
escape unscathed. I argue instead that the new government for Liberia should establish a legal
forum to address civil war violations. This forum would only try those figures most responsible
for fomenting war and looting the Liberian state. This Comment does not, however, address the
type of remedy, e.g. imprisonment or fine, thatthe forum should impose .
A Special Court for Liberia could serve a threefold purpose. First, this mechanism could
further promote the campaign to end the culture of impunity in Liberia and in Africa as a whole.
Second, international commitment to Liberia would show a definite commitment to address
violence in Africa in an even-handed manner. Finally, a trial of this sort could serve to prevent
future state sponsored violence by promoting law reform in Liberia. I recognize that the United
States should and probably will play an important role in Liberia’s future. The United States has
a historical and a political duty to Liberia to serve as a guarantor of peace in Liberia just as
France and Britain have done in conflicts in Cote d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone respectively.16
I.
LIBERIA AND IT’S NEIGHBOR’S HISTORY OF EXCLUSIONS, GRIEVANCES, AND GREED
Before discussing the most recent Liberian peace agreement, it is crucial to discuss the
economic, social, and political history that has brought Liberia where it is today. One of the

16

See, e.g., ADEKEYE ADEBAJO, BUILDING PEACE IN WEST AFRICA: LIBERIA, SIERRA LEONE, AND GUINEA-BISSAU
93-95 (1989) (discussing the British in Sierra Leone); Chris Mullin, Speech at the UK Mission to the United Nations
(Feb. 6, 2004) (welcoming the willingness of the United States to take the lead in Liberia as the French are doing in
Cote d’Ivoire), at http://www.ukun.org/articles_show.asp?SarticleType=17&Article_ID=731.
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central arguments throughout this Comment is that in negotiating peace agreements, the
development community and policy makers should not forget to examine what has happened in
the past and try to avoid the same errors. The policy makers who have drafted the current peace
agreement in Liberia seem to have forgotten Liberia’s colonial history, Liberia’s history under
Liberian leadership and the abuses committed throughout Liberia’s civil wars.
A. Early Political, Social, and Economic History of Africa’s First Republic under Black
Leadership
Although Liberia was never officially colonized like other African states during the
European “scramble for Africa,”17 the ideology upon which Liberia was founded was informed
by the same foundational ideologies justifying colonization in other African countries. 18
Liberia’s origins date back to 1822, when the settlement of Monrovia (named after U.S.
President James Monroe)19 was established.20 Aided by the American Colonization Society and
many other principally African-American groups, freed slaves who had long harbored hopes of
returning to Africa began coming to Liberia as early as 1820, when the first group of about
eighty sailed on the ship Elizabeth.21 While maintaining strong ties to the United States, Liberia
became an independent nation in 1847.22
Little is known of the history of present day Liberia before its modern establishment, but
its ethnic situation is complex. Of the sixteen indigenous ethnic groups, no one group in

17

See generally, ROLAND OLIVER & ANTHONY ATMORE, AFRICA SINCE 1800, 65 (4th ed. 1994). The “scramble for
Africa” describes the manner in which European powers pushed for the partition of Africa during the third quarter of
the nineteenth century, WALTER RODNEY, HOW EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA, 137 (1982) (describing period
where Europeans made a grab for whatever they thought spelled profits in Africa).
18
PHAM, supra note 1, at 20.
19
EGHOSA E. OSAGHAE, ETHNICTY, CLASS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR STATE POWER IN LIBERIA 25 (1996).
20
PHAM, supra note 1, at 12.
21
Id. at 5-11.
22
Id. at 17.
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particular has ever represented a majority of the Liberian population. 23 And, as in other colonial
contexts, the Americo-Liberian elites were able to gain access to the lands of the indigenous
people by negotiating land contracts in exchange for foreign luxury goods and conquest. 24
Before the arrival of the Americo-Liberians, these groups previously had had contact with white
people principally for trade purposes.25
It is now a common understanding that the Americo-Liberians (some descendants of
freed Black American slaves and others descendants of captured Africans who were intercepted
during their trans-Atlantic passage) founded the state of Liberia upon the perceived superiority of
the light-skinned elite over the darker-skinned natives. 26 The only difference between the
colonial context in Liberia and that in other West African countries appears to be that the
founders of Liberia were Black.27 Even though the Americo-Liberians never comprised more
than 5% of the Liberian population, they ruled for nearly forty years through an elite oligarchy
that excluded and oppressed the indigenous Liberians. 28 In fact, all twenty-one Liberian
presidents with the exception of Samuel K. Doe have been Americo-Liberian.29
Recognizing that the state had to have some method of controlling the indigenous people,
the Americo-Liberians ruled through a colonial idiom of power, the indirect rule system. 30 This

23

OSAGHAE, supra note 19; PHAM supra note 1, at 12. These sixteen ethnic groups are divided between three ethnolinguistic groups: the Mel, the Mande, and the Kwa. The Mande are divided into eight ethnic groups, the Kwa into
six, and the Mel into two. PHAM, supra note 1, at 12. The Mel are concentrated in the northwest of the country.
The Kwa have historically been coastal seafearing people and were often recruited to assist European traders and
sailors sailing in local waters. Id. The Mel and Mande speaking peoples had contacts with Europeans dating back
to the seventeenth century; their chieftains traded African slaves for Western commodities. Id.
24
See OSAGHAE, supra note 19, at 29-31.
25
See PHAM, supra note 1 at 12.
26
IKECHI MGBEOJI, COLLECTIVE INSECURITY: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, UNILATERALISM, & GLOBAL ORDER 5, 7
(2003).
27
See, e.g., OSAGHAE, supra note 19, at, 28, 31, 42 (affirming the appropriateness of the use of the colonial model to
describe rule by Americo-Liberians-a peripheralised ruling class which lacks an independent material base and
which is consistently challenged from within as a hegemonic class).
28
ADEBAJO, supra note 16, at 45-46; PHAM, supra note 1, at 14.
29
Samuel K. Ngaima, Liberian Civil War, 27 FUTURICS 102, 106 (2003).
30
OLIVER & ATMORE, supra note 17 at 190; PHAM, supra note 1, at 31.
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was a system “where the central government would recognize the preexisting tribal [authority]
structures [by granting] local rulers control over their subjects in exchange for [collaboration]
with Monrovia,” the capital. 31 Liberia’s interior territories were divided into districts with
preexisting ethnic and cultural allegiances in mind.32 Within the districts, “the chiefs were [to
be] chosen according to traditional custom” with final approval in the hands of a district
commissioner. 33 As long as there was no conflict with the central government, the district
commissioners were to uphold traditional power of chiefs over their peoples.34 The primary duty
of the chief vis-à-vis Monrovia was the collection of valuable taxes and provision of free labor to
the government.35 Even though there was moderate inclusion of indigenous people into Liberian
mainstream society through the indirect rule system, it was not until the 1940s that the
indigenous were allowed the benefits of Liberian citizenship.36 This social context coupled with
declining economic prospects would soon become a major grievance for many Liberians.
Like other colonial states, Liberia had the potential to be an economic leader throughout
West Africa, but the government’s economic practices have led to a continual drain of the
country’s resources. In addition to one-sided contracts with the United States, Liberia entered
into abusive loan agreements and contracts with several international lending institutions. 37
Customs duties and tax revenues were often pledged as security for loan repayment. 38
Furthermore, coercive and one-sided dealings between Liberian elites and foreign companies,

31

PHAM, supra note 1, at 31
Id.
33
Id. at 31.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 32
36
Id.
37
Id. at 35
38
Id.
32
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such as granting of exclusive mineral rights, and securing loans using future customs revenues
and duty free imports, contributed to Liberia’s declining economic prospects.39
One concrete example of bad economic practice has been Liberia’s manner of exploiting
its rubber. Rubber has always been Liberia’s key resource but Liberia’s relationship with the
United States has virtually ruined the potential for that resource to benefit the country. The
United States’ relationship to the Liberian rubber industry began when the United States became
the world’s leading consumer in rubber, at which time it used Liberian rubber plantations to
exploit the rubber used to meet the demands of America’s expanding automobile industry.40
However, the agreements between Liberia and the Firestone Rubber and Tire Company were not
the fairest in their terms.41 One such agreement granted Firestone a ninety-nine year lease on a
Liberian plantation for a $1 an acre rent for the first year and a flat $6,000 per year rent
thereafter.42
The social and economic problems in Liberia--including its declining economic prospects
and the inability of the elite to integrate the indigenous people-- continued from its founding
through the 1970s, when Liberia’s problems were further exacerbated. 43 Liberia reached a
breaking point following the imposition of rice subsidies, Liberia’s staple food, in 1979.44 The
effect of the rice subsidies was an increase in the price of rice to a sum representing more than
one-third of the monthly income for an average Liberian family.45 The price increase sparked
campaigns of protest and civil disobedience. Amadu Sesay argues that the rice riots of 1979

39

Id. at 32-41.
Id.at 38-39
41
Id. at 37-41; See also, OSAGHAE, supra note 19 at 40 (implying that Firestone was more of an exploiter than an
investor).
42
PHAM, supra note 1, at 39.
43
MGBEOII, supra note 26, at 2, 11.
44
Id. at 11.
45
PHAM, supra note 1, at 76.
40
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marked a turning point in Liberia.46 The incident left then-President Tolbert weakened and the
dominant political party of Liberia, the True Whig Party, split.47 In the meantime, indigenous
political opposition quickly formed and demanded concessions, such as having the right to
register as political parties to challenge the upcoming elections.48 When Tolbert decided to push
back the 1980 elections, the scene was set for the coup led by Samuel Doe, an indigenous lowranking soldier, that would break the domination of the Americo-Liberian elites.49
B. Indigenous Rule under President Doe
Instead of reversing the course of Liberian history, the Samuel Doe regime followed suit
in 1980. Doe did not bring democracy, equality, or long term economic stability to the country.50
Instead he became the one of the most repressive Liberian leaders in its history, ruling through
an idiom of divide and destroy.51 Doe contributed to the ethnicization of the Liberian army by
filling the most important military positions with people of the Krahn ethnic group (Doe’s own
group) and purging the army of Gios and Manos.52 He also alienated other political and social
groups by disproportionately representing Krahn and Mandingo people in government
positions.53
Though Doe was weak as a leader, foreign support heavily bolstered his regime. The
Reagan administration embraced him as a line of defense against the Soviets during the Cold

46

DR AMADU SESAY, Historical Background to the Liberian Crisis in THE LIBERIAN CRISIS: A PHOTOGRAPHIC
EXPEDITION (1992).
47
PHAM, supra note 1, at 76-77; OSAGHAE, supra note 19, at 56-60.
48
PHAM, supra note 1, at 76-77; OSAGHAE, supra note 19, at 56-60.
49
PHAM, supra note 1, at 78-79; OSAGHAE, supra note 19 at 60-65.
50
ADEBAJO, supra note 16, at 45-46 (citing Doe’s instigation of ethnic rivalries); OSAGHAE, supra note 19, at 66
(citing instances of political repression under Doe); PHAM, supra note 1, at 90-91 (arguing that Doe failed to
maintain productive economic relationships with the United States, the IMF, or the World Bank).
51
ADEBAJO, supra note 16, at 44- 45.
52
Id.
53
Id.
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War.54 In fact, the Liberian government was the largest recipient of U.S. aid in Sub-Saharan
Africa by the time Doe was inaugurated such aid representing roughly one third of the Liberian
government’s revenues.55 Between 1981 and 1985, U.S. economic and military assistance to
Liberia totaled over $500 million.56 Nonetheless, Liberia’s international debt under Doe rose
from $750 million to $1.4 billion. 57 Even though the Liberian government was particularly
repressive, the United States continued to aid Liberia to prevent Doe from turning to Libya and
the Soviet Union.58 The support that Liberia received from the United States quickly withered
after the Cold War.59 Some argue that it was the combination of widespread corruption, the
decline in revenues from Liberia’s main exports (rubber, timber, and iron ore), and the cessation
of the U.S. economic assistance that caused the out-break of civil war in 1989.60
C. The Effects of Charles Taylor’s War Without End: Civil War 1989-1997, 2001-2003
Although few writers have dealt sufficiently with the causes of the Liberian conflict,61
readily identifiable factors contributed to the first conflict in Liberia which brought Charles
Taylor to the presidency in 1997. The internal factors included: (1) the legacy of the AmericoLiberian insistence on total social, political, and economic exclusion of the Liberian indigenous
population from Liberian society; (2) the subsequent reliance of Doe on ethnic mistrust to divide
the Liberian people; (3) natural resource exploitation without economic development; and (4)
the proliferation of competitive warlord factions.62 External factors included the ineffectiveness
of the international community in coming to the aid of the Liberian people earlier, the dominance
54

PHAM, supra note 1, at 88-89.
PHAM, supra note 1, at 89.
56
Id.
57
OSAGHAE, supra note 19, at 74- 77.
58
PHAM, supra note 1, at 88.
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of ECOWAS as the only regional organization to come to the aid of Liberia, and the interference
of contiguous states in Liberian affairs.63 These conditions allowed the half-indigenous, halfAmerico-Liberian warlord, Charles Taylor, to control the war time scene in Liberia.
Charles Taylor’s seven-year civil war resulted in his ascendancy to the Presidency, and
was successful for several key reasons.

First, factionalism prevented other groups from

becoming powerful enough to win the strategic battles, and Taylor gained access to more
resources than the other factions.64 In fact, Liberia’s resources probably provided more incentive
to continue the war than any political goal of these factions.65 Battles were fought for control of
areas rich in economic resources—gold, diamond, timber, iron ore, rubber, and tree crop. 66
Taylor individually may have derived $75 million annually from these exports.67
Second, regional actors greatly influenced Taylor’s consolidation of power. Countries
that aligned themselves with the Taylor regime were also rewarded. Through Cote d’Ivoire,
Taylor had access to bases and commercial interests.68 Burkina Faso lent soldiers.69 Libyan
President Muammar Qaddafi also supported Taylor.70
Taylor’s 1997 victory did not successfully convert him from a warlord to a statesman.
After several peace talks and treaties, Taylor agreed to a ceasefire in virtual exchange for the
presidency.71 Some suggest that Taylor was voted into office for fear that he would cause more
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fighting if he was not.72 But Taylor’s presidential rule was short-lived.73 Only five years after
Liberia began a transition to peace, the country erupted once again into civil war.74 Taylor ruled
by centralizing power through the reward of loyalists and through the intimidation of critics.75
High-ranking officials misused state power to further their own political objectives.76 Similarly,
Taylor and his partners monopolized profitable businesses like fuel and food, and gained from
imports. 77

State institutions, including the judiciary, the legislature, the human rights

commission, and the commission on reconciliation, remained weakunder Taylor .78
Signs of a second civil war began to show in 1999 when rebels crossed into Liberia from
Guinea.

Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for

Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) waged war to unseat Taylor in 2000.79 In many ways, LURD
and MODEL are new names for old factions. LURD was formed by Liberian exiles in response
to feelings of frustration and perceived exclusion from the implementation of the Abuja Peace
Accords that ended the first civil war.80
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D. Sierra Leone’s Civil War: Comparing Civil Wars
The origins of Liberia and Sierra Leone followed similar patterns81 and the crises of these
countries are so intertwined that some scholars doubt that peace can exist in one locale if it does
not exist in the other.82
Sierra Leone began as the Freetown Colony, founded in 1792 by a private group of
British philanthropists-- the Sierra Leone Company-- as a haven for freed Black slaves.83 The
company managed the Freetown settlement until the corporation was dissolved in 1808.84 Sierra
Leone then became a crown colony and continued to receive assistance from Britain. Sierra
Leone received its independence in 1961.85
Though the beginnings and causes of Sierra Leone’s civil war are due to more than the
encouragement of Charles Taylor, the fact that the same players have operated in both states
suggests a strong linkage. During Liberia’s first civil war, Taylor used Sierra Leone’s diamond
fields in the north of the country as a source of income for his own military operation, and
supported the new Sierra Leonean rebel movement, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led
by Taylor’s friend Foday Sankoh.86 Sankoh’s troops entered Sierra Leone on March 23, 1991,
beginning the civil war in Sierra Leone that lasted for eleven years and resulted in the death of
tens of thousands of people. Sierra Leone’s civil war was primarily a war over resources.87
As a result of Taylor’s support for rebels in Sierra Leone, the governments of both Sierra
Leone and Guinea began to organize Liberian refugees inside their borders to fight against
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Taylor’s NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia).88 In Liberia’s second civil war, the rebel
group LURD was a group of Liberian dissidents composed of both Liberians and Sierra
Leoneans who did not support Taylor’s alliance with the RUF.89 The Sierra Leonean component
of LURD, the “kamajor militia,” fought for the government of Sierra Leone against Sankoh’s
troops in the Sierra Leonean war, and also played a part in Liberia’s second civil war.90
E. Abuses Committed in Sierra Leone and Liberia
Numerous organizations have documented the abuses from both wars in Sierra Leone and
Liberia.91 The abuses committed might fall into three categories under international law: war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious human rights abuses.92 Addressing Sierra
Leone first, abuses committed included rape, murder, abduction, and forced labor.93 All parties
used children and youth to carry out human rights violations.94
In Liberia, there were widespread rapes, massacres, mutilation, torture, forced
conscription of child combatants, and cannibalism. 95

Liberians committed human rights

violations in the Sierra Leonean territory as well.96 Danny Hoffman, a cultural anthropologist
who studied rebels and government fighters who moved in and out of the Sierra Leone and
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Liberian wars, has explained the phenomenon of atrocities against civilians as a military tactic
that employed the following reasoning: “When the international community responds to African
crises, the more atrocious the conflict, the greater the level of aid.” 97 Again, this wartime
economy profited rebels and rebel leaders more than the legitimatestate econo mic system.98
In the Liberian context, some have noted the religious and cultic aspects of certain
killings. 99 Pham reports that all sides during the conflict in Liberia employed the power of
traditional beliefs and symbols in an attempt to reinforce the morale of supporters and to
encourage fear in opponents.100 During the first civil war, Charles Taylor cultivated the support
of the indigenous religious cults of Liberia.101 After the first civil war, reports surfaced of ritual
cannibalism; many Monrovians believe that even Charles Taylor participated in the human
sacrifices.102

97

See generally, Hoffman, supra note 80, at 211-226. Hoffman explains that the kamajor militia, Sierra Leoneon
government fighters employed to contain the rebels during the Sierra Leonean civil war, became increasingly
disillusioned with the DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) campaign at the end of the Sierra
Leone war because RUF fighters were rewarded with incentive packages, job training, and reintegration benefits,
while the kamajors were not rewarded for their work in defense of the established order. Id. The result was that the
Sierra Leonean kamajors and Liberian dissidents formed the Liberian rebel movement LURD that led the attacks in
the second Liberian civil war. Id. Hoffman sees the tactics used by LURD as much more deadly and civilian
targeted than the attacks used by the same kamajor fighters in Sierra Leone, which for him was an indication that
being a rebel has its pay off. Id.
98
See LEONARD & STRAUS, supra note 4, at 68-70.
99
PHAM, supra note 1, at 64-7. Several scholars have devoted attention to ancient religious societies in Liberian
culture. See e.g., ELLIS, supra note 3, at 220-280 (connecting war, power, and the spiritual order). The central
government of Liberia has never been able to assert its control over the Poro and the Sande societies, that play the
role in transmission of traditional lore and initiation of indigenous Liberians. Id. These religious cults were popular
before the creation of the state and during the Americo-Liberian rule. Today, even practicing Christians are initiated
into these societies. During his rule, President Barclay attempted to eradicate this aspect of Liberian society by
jailing certain ringleaders. Members of these societies have killed and consumed individuals, raided towns, and
brought human flesh to market for sale. In 1952 President Tubman passed a law creating a post of secretary of the
interior charged with overseeing matters pertaining to these indigenous societies. Yet President Tolbert, Tubman’s
successor, President Doe and President Taylor were all initiated into these cults. PHAM, supra note 1, at 64-7.
100
Id. at 66.
101
Id. at 63-67
102
Id. at 67.

19

Scott
In Sierra Leone the war officially ended when the RUF signed a peace agreement with
the Government of Sierra Leone on July 7, 1999, to end the civil war;103 but the war on the
ground continued until 2000 when Foday Sankoh was captured and the RUF began to hand over
their weapons.104 In Liberia, Charles Taylor agreed to meet in the Ghanaian capital of Accra to
discuss a peace plan, until he fled when an indictment for his arrest was issued during the peace
talks.105 Although the peace plan was implemented, Taylor is currently in exile in Nigeria.106
Recent evidence indicates that Taylor is still receiving money from his supporters in Liberia,
possibly to incite future rebellions.107
II.
FAILED STATES AND THE CULTURE OF IMPUNITY
Liberia, as a failed state, is plagued by leaders who rule through a culture of impunity.
Sierra Leone has a similar history, and it too has been characterized as a failed state.108 The civil
wars that plagued both of these countries were caused by a complete break-down in the elites’
ability to assure the security of their countries. As a result, rebels and several governmental
figures were able to carry out war on the ground, take control of key state resources, and commit
grave human rights violations. Despite years of war, both Sierra Leone and Liberia were able to
end “official” violence in their countries through careful negotiations of peace accords with these
rebels, elite politicians and select members of civil society.

103

Lome Accord, Annex, supra note 11.
PHAM, supra note 1, at 167.
105
Kathy Ward, Might v. Right: Charles Taylor and the Sierra Leone Special Court, 11 No. 1 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 8
(2003)
106
Agence France Press, Charles Taylor: Exiled but Still Pulling Strings (Oct. 21, 2003) at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/liberia/2003/1012strings.htm.
107
The Analyst, Taylor’s Money Trail Raises Eyebrows (Dec. 17, 2004) at
http://allafrica.com/stories/200412170160.html.(last visited Mar. 12, 2005).
108
ROBERT I. ROTBERG, The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair, in WHEN
STATES FAIL: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 11 (Robert Rotberg ed., 2004) ( [hereinafter ROTBERG , WHEN STATES
FAIL].
104

20

Scott
In this Part I make two points. First, the focus on negotiated peace agreements in Liberia
illustrates the problems Liberia faces as a modern state. As Susan Ackerman has aptly stated:
“[T]he options for law reform [in states created in the aftermath of violent internal conflicts] may
be limited by the very process that permits the state to exist in the first place.”109 In other words,
law reform is limited by the negotiated peace. These peace agreements place the majority of
their focus on neutralizing rebel groups, while there is no equal attention paid to elite sponsored
violence, the real threat to peace and stability in Liberia. In this way, the negotiations have failed
to account for the history that has brought Liberia where it is today.
Second, the agreements should reflect the lessons learned in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone
also initially privileged diplomacy over justice in its peace negotiations, but later took the
important step to pursue human rights violators in court upon realizing that the Lome Peace
Accord and other peace keeping efforts had failed.110
While the agreements offend abstract notions of social justice, the drafters of these
agreements claim that they are the only way to end armed conflict. Yet even with this tension,
these agreements may contain a solution to Liberia’s problems. Through careful redrafting,
these agreements could recognize that legal mechanisms crafted to change the nature of elite
power over the Liberian state can end the culture of impunity.
A. Colonial Origins of the Culture of Impunity and the Failed State Phenomenon
The categorization of Liberia as a failed state, evidenced by the complete lack of security
provided by the state for its inhabitants and its concomitant submission to a culture of impunity,
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is directly related to its quasi-colonial origins and its neo-colonial governmental structure.111
Therefore, we cannot examine the modern state of Liberia without looking more closely at the
colonial form of rule in Liberia. Establishing the historical framework is crucial because even
though a primary cause of state failure is destructive leadership112 (i.e. the avaricious policies of
all of the Presidents of Liberia), the history of colonial rule in Liberia and the influence of the
colonial period in Africa paved the way for the of this culture of impunity.
Liberia is no different from the other failed states in Africa, however, in the sense that its
leaders made destructive decisions that paved the way to state failure. Other examples include
President Mobutu Sese Seko’s three-plus decades of kleptocratic rule that “sucked Zaire (now
the Democratic Republic of Congo, or DRC) dry” until he was deposed in 1997.113 In Sierra
Leone, President Siaka Stevens (1967-85) systematically plundered his tiny country and
instrumentalized disorder. 114

President Mohamed Siad Barre (1969-91) did the same in
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Somalia.115 These rulers were personally greedy, but as predatory leaders they also licensed and
sponsored the avarice of others, thus preordaining the destruction of their states. All of these
countries, including Liberia, have shared the experience of colonial rule, and for this reason I
will explain how colonial rule can directly cause a state to collapse. Liberia is a unique case of
state failure, however, because of its origins and its particular claim of emblematic African
democracy.
The culture of impunity that has contributed to state failure in Africa in general and in
Liberia in particular grew directly out of the colonial institution of indirect rule. In short, the
colonial institution of indirect rule gave birth to the notion that it is acceptable to rule over
people through illegitimate forms of control.116 This birth of illegitimacy during the colonial era
has carried over into the post-colonial modern nation-state.
The most obvious and long-lasting failure of the colonial state has been its engendering
of modern forms of inequality- liberal government in form but class division in fact. Although
colonialism claimed to bring civilization to the “native savage,” the post-colonial theorist Aime
Cesaire argues that colonialism as a system of rule was not a “question of eliminating the
inequalities among men but of widening them and making them into a law.” 117

This

phenomenon is best illustrated through a description of the colonial mode of control:
Here, the land remained a communal-“customary”-possession. . . .The tribal leadership
was either selectively reconstituted as the hierarchy of the local state or freshly imposed
where none had existed as in “stateless societies.” Here political inequality went
alongside civil inequality. Both were grounded in a legal dualism. Alongside received
law was implemented a customary law that regulated non-market relations, in land, in
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personal (family), and in community affairs. For the subject population of natives,
indirect rule signified a mediated—decentralized—despotism.118

The manipulation of tribal leadership and the imposition of a two-tiered system of law in African
colonies meant that African societies were organized differently in rural areas from urban ones,
thus producing a “Janus-faced” or bifurcated state.119 “It contained a duality: two forms of
power under a single hegemonic authority” where urban power spoke the language of civil
society and civil rights, rural power of community and culture. 120

Native chiefs and

commissioners dispensed customary justice while white magistrates dispensed modern justice to
non-natives.121 Yet the development of the political center at the expense of the periphery meant
that there would be no way for the rural to hold accountable the leadership developing in the
center.
The independence of African countries was successful in the sense that African states
finally were able to exercise their right of self-determination.122 Independence, however, failed
in two important ways: in the manner that power was transferred to the indigenous rulers, and in
the way that it left Africa largely underdeveloped.123 Most post-colonial independent African
states inherited from their colonial rulers, whatever their limitations, a ‘framework’ of internal
and external security, efficient and disinterested administration, sound finance, a basic economic
infrastructure of roads, railways and harbors, and at least the beginnings of modern social
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services in education, health, and community development.124 Yet between colonization and
independence there was no effort made to create a legitimate core of properly trained leaders
who could then build on these colonial frameworks.
The colonial trend of developing frameworks of states instead of real states and investing
in weak material structures characterized by mono-cultural and externally-oriented economies in
Africa led to authoritarian rule, that facilitated the monopolization of both political power and
economic activities by the metropolitan bourgeoisie and the successor national bourgeoisie.125
This occurred because the indirect rule system never attempted to make the center of colonial
states accountable to territories outside of the capital.
An example of how African states were manipulated at the expense of the masses to the
benefit of European powers and a small elite core may be useful. The colonial system was first
and foremost an economic system whereby by the metropole (the colonizing state) sought an
economic advantage through its colonization of the periphery state.126 African countries were
industrialized during the colonial period where private foreign companies were integrated into
African economic systems under a management system that operated to the complete benefit of
the metropole.127
First, private companies often forced unequal exchange upon African countries, in that
there were major differences between the prices of African exports of raw materials and their
importation of manufactured goods.128 The colonial state could guarantee optimal conditions
under which private companies could exploit African countries because of the sheer political and

124

OLIVER & ATMORE, supra note 17, at 266.
LEONARD & STRAUS, supra note 4, at 6 (arguing that the postcolonial state has less ability to coerce its subjects,
leading to a heavier reliance on patronage).
126
Id. at 10.
127
RODNEY, supra note 17, at 149.
128
Id. at 160.
125

25

Scott
military supremacy of the colonizing force.129 Recall, for example, the Firestone Agreements in
Liberia.130 Although Liberia was blessed with rubber as a natural resource, the United States
completely controlled the industry.131 Historian Walter Rodney explains that this control was
reinforced by a massive military presence of Americans in Liberia.132 Rodney further explains
that the rubber production in Liberia symbolized the colonial phenomenon of “growth without
development” where “there was growth of the so-called enclave import-export sector, but the
only things which developed were dependency and underdevelopment.”133
Second, by the end of the colonial period, these fragile state structures could no longer
stand without the financial support of the colonial state.134 These states had no ability to act
independently because they were left politically, economically, and militarily weak. Often the
African leaders who were chosen to succeed the colonial state were no more than puppets
installed to ensure that the colonial metropole would continue to benefit even at the end of the
colonial era.135
Turning to Liberia, during the colonial period, Liberian elites implemented a system of
indirect rule to facilitate easy communication between the capital city of Monrovia and the
hinterland where most indigenous Liberian people lived. 136 In many ways this indirect rule
system implemented under Liberia’s period of black colonialism was no less patronizing and
demeaning than European forms of colonialism.137 The Liberian elites who first ruled Liberia
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were the colonizers, and their successors, Americo-Liberians and those of indigenous origin,
ruled through the same colonial idioms as those employed by European colonizers.138 Under
Americo-Liberian domination, the hinterland Liberians acted as implementing agents for the
Monrovian government 139 .

Even after indigenous Liberians became more integrated into

Liberian society, the countryside was never developed to their benefit. Rather, the hinterland
was opened up solely for exploitation by foreign investors.140 A system of patronage flourished
where access to the country’s resources was granted to a few, usually those connected to the
heads of state or government officials by kinship lines or some other connection. 141
Appointments and promotions in the civil services, the police forces, the judiciary, and the state
corporations became subject to party patronage.142 Liberia fits well in this description of the
colonial influence on African states.
The question that remains is how the culture of impunity grew from this history. I define
the culture of impunity as the conscious decision by leaders who have inherited these weak state
structures to turn their backs to the problems of the post-colonial state, and instead to find ways
to benefit from impoverishment and misery of the people over which they rule. The culture of
impunity is the particular method through which rulers, particularly those in African states, use
the fragile post-colonial state as a personal withdrawal account without ever reinvesting. In
these states there is lack of punishment, investigation, or justice. There is always the possibility
of committing crimes without having to face punishment and implicit approval of the morality of
these crimes. Thus there is the idea that what is done without any punishment, can be repeated

138

See OSAGHAE, supra note 19 at 23.
PHAM, supra note 1, at 59-60.
140
OSAGHAE, supra note 19, at 46.
141
Id. at 50-53.
142
Id.
139

27

Scott
without fear. Other characteristics of this culture include skimming from the state treasury,
restricting participatory processes, and distancing of the ruling families from their subjects.143
In other words, it does not matter to these leaders that their state has in fact failed.144 Robert
Rotberg, one of the leading scholars of failed states, explains that even when a state is weak,
failing, failed or collapsed, ruling “families and cadres arrogate to themselves increasing portions
of the available pie.”145 Rotberg suggests that “once greed has claimed the behavioral goals of
actors within failed states . . . peace is harder to achieve.”146
The reality has often been that impunious leaders do not benefit financially from peace.147
Instead, their modus operandi is violence and manipulation of state resources. On the political
side of state failure, leaders and their associates often subvert prevailing democratic norms,
coerce legislatures and bureaucracies into subservience, strangle judicial independence, block
civil society, and gain control over security and defense forces.148 Charles Taylor and other rebel
groups did this in 1996, when they threatened the outbreak of another civil war unless the
Liberian people elected Taylor president and his and other rebel groups to key governmental
offices.149 Only negotiation with Taylor could replace war.150 Another element that contributes
to complete instability in failed states is that the leaders usually patronize an ethnic group, clan,
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class, or kin while causing other groups to feel excluded or discriminated against.151 Though the
colonial state laid the foundation for the illegitimate African state, bad leaders solidify this
illegitimacy. Rotberg observes:
In the last phase of failure, the states’ legitimacy crumbles. Lacking meaningful or
realistic democratic means of redress, protesters take to the streets or mobilize along
ethnic, religious, or linguistic lines. Because small arms and even more formidable
weapons are cheap and easy to find, because historical grievances are readily
remembered or manufactured, and because the spoils of separation, autonomy, or a total
takeover are attractive, the potential for violent conflict grows exponentially as the states’
power and legitimacy recede.152
This culture of impunity as the primary symptom of state failure in Liberia developed in
Liberia despite the fact that it was by no means a resource-poor country. Liberia has always
been a resource-rich country, and with the proper development of its industries the country had
the huge potential to flourish.153 To its detriment, however, Liberian leaders such as Samuel
Doe, Prince Johnson, and Charles Taylor have failed to remedy its weak institutional capacity,
instead preferring to support bureaucracies that have no sense of professional responsibility and
that exist only to carry out the order of the executive and to oppress the citizens.154 It has not
helped that the United States and the international community have dealt generously with
successive Liberian governments even during times when it was clear that the government
abused the funds received.155
The international economic organizations recognized this potential for state failure in
African states. In the 1980s these organizations promoted structural adjustment policies aimed at
moving African economies away from state-run systems by placing businesses under private
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management and promoting deregulation.

156

Yet the IMF and World Bank quickly

acknowledged that these purely market-oriented economic policies were not effective in
achieving sustainable economic development. 157 This might be due party to the fact that
mandated conditions were never enforced, causing the perpetuation of poor policies and the
strengthening of elites.158 In the 1990s, the international community began to focus on good
governance and democratization, key features of the rule of law, as the method to achieve
economic development and growth.159 Organizations such as the World Bank began to define
governance in ways that stressed the manner in which social resources are controlled to exercise
political power and promote social and economic development.160 Similarly, the International
Monetary Fund began to emphasize the importance of good governance as a condition to
assistance.161 These organizations now focus their attention on the role played by governmental
authorities in establishing a framework for economic activity and in deciding how the benefits of
such activity are distributed.162 Even though a healthy amount of criticism exists about the goals
of these organizations, their recent focus on governance has helped to reveal the essence of
relations between those who govern and those who are governed in Africa.163
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The possibility exists that the leaders themselves are the source of instability and violence
in African states. The chain that follows is simple: the social contract that binds citizens and
central governmental structures is forfeited when citizens believe leaders are illegitimate. At this
precise moment, citizens transfer their allegiances to communal warlords. 164

This short

explanation merely shows the heavy past that Liberia must face. The remainder of this Comment
provides an explanation for why the elite in a country like Liberia must experience a shock in
order to move out of this post-colonial phase.
Aime Cesaire provides one perspective on how a post-colonial society should progress:
“It is a new society we must create, with the help of all our brother slaves, a society rich with all
the productive power of modern times, warm with all the fraternity of olden days.”165 I argue
here that one target for change must be promotion of the reform of the elite and the conception of
ruling and power in Africa. Ending the era of the old-guard politicians, promoting political
leaders who are talented, and focusing on how to change the behavior of high ranking officials
must form the heart of the project of democracy in African countries. On Cesaire’s view, the
dehumanizing effect of colonialism does not just create an animal out of the native but also out
of the colonizer himself.166 Cesaire bringshome the point that “no one colonizes innocently, that
no one colonizes with impunity either; that a nation which colonizes” calls for its own
punishment.167
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B. Sierra Leone and Liberia’s Peace Agreements: Why the Peace Agreement
Approach Furthers the Culture of Impunity
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that, to promote reform in countries like
Liberia where there has been a history of state abuse, reform mechanisms should focus on the
very actors that have historically implemented destructive state activities. Unfortunately, the two
peace agreements that officially ended the wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia did not serve this
goal. Instead, the agreements created an arrangement that will continue this culture of impunity.
As Peter Pham so aptly notes, parceling out government agencies in the name of peace “tie[s] the
authority of leaders of the various political groups directly to their ability to let their subalterns
exploit profitable opportunities at the expense of the state.” 168 In this section, I show that
although the peace agreements in both Sierra Leone and Liberia were nearly identical documents
in the way that rebel groups were able to secure leadership over key governmental branches,
Sierra Leone recognized this flaw and changed course upon failure of its agreement, ultimately
implementing the Special Court for Sierra Leone. To contrast, and despite recent breaches of its
agreement169, Liberia has not decided to change course.
1. Sierra Leone’s Lome Accord: The First Path Taken
Importantly, the Lome Accord is not the tool that has sustained peace in Sierra Leone.170
Nevertheless, the lessons that the Sierra Leonean government learned through its negotiation
process are considered here.
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The peace agreement that officially ended Sierra Leone’s eleven year civil war, the Lome
Accord, signed in the Togolese capital Lome, was negotiated between the government of Sierra
Leone and the RUF, Sierra Leone’s most infamous rebel group.171 The Lome Accord provided
for the following: (1) a cease-fire between the warring parties and disarmament of the RUF172;
(2) complete amnesty to all combatants173; (3) transition of the RUF into a political party174; (4)
allocation of official control over Sierra Leone’s diamond minds to Foday Sankoh by naming
him chairman of strategic minerals; and (5) establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission.175 Significantly, the UN ultimately made a reservation that the amnesty could not
cover international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious
violations of international humanitarian law.176
The Lome Accord quickly unraveled.177 The Lome Accord assured a lucrative deal for
Foday Sankoh, the most infamous rebel leader of the RUF, under which he was given complete
control over the mineral resources that he exploited throughout the war. 178 Yet instead of
hastening peace, there were reports that Sankoh was again encouraging breaches of the
agreement. 179 Reports surfaced that the RUF continued to participate in the killing of UN
peacekeepers and the capturing of others even after the signing of the Lome Peace.180 Some say
that it was only the capture of Foday Sankoh and his subsequent death that saved the situation on
171
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the ground. 181 Therefore, though the Lome Accord diplomatically sought to end the war by
negotiating with rebel groups, this sequence of events suggests that it was not the negotiation that
ended the hostilities, but rather the mere fortuitous death of the lead rebel.
As part of the peace process, the government in Sierra Leone held public workshops and
conferences with civil society engagement, helping to incorporate policies specifically
addressing the needs of the Sierra Leonean people on their journey to reconciliation.182 From
this process, the people of Sierra Leone implemented a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.183
Though some commentators were skeptical about the TRC’s ability to fulfill its mandate due to
administrative, staffing and financial difficulties, the TRC has been successful.184 Currently the
government plans to implement the recommendations of the TRC report, disseminate the report,
and set up a war victims’ reparation fund.185 Some have commended the TRC commissioners
for their creation of a child-friendly version of the report, noting that this is the first time in the
world that a child-friendly version of a Truth and Reconciliation Report has been produced.186
Finally, the Sierra Leonean government went one step further than the Lome Accord and
the TRC. Upon realizing that the Agreement did not go far enough to remedy elite violations,
Sierra Leone entered into an agreement with the United Nations to form the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, with the special mandate to try those most responsible for the violations during
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Sierra Leone’s war.187 Sierra Leone’s choice to include justice in its peace process is discussed
later in this part.
2. Liberia’s Path to Peace?: The Comprehensive Peace Agreement
As it stands, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement [hereinafter CPA] for Liberia
articulates the structure and scope for a transition government to prepare Liberia for democratic
elections in 2005.188 The National Transition Government of Liberia (NTGL) led by Chairman
Gyude Bryant, a respected Liberian businessman, is scheduled to operate for two years from
October 14, 2003 to October 25, 2005, at which time elections will be held for the next Liberian
President. 189 The mandate of the NTGL will not expire until January 2006, when the next
elected government of Liberia will be inaugurated.190
The most important provisions of the agreement are:

(1) the call for a total and

permanent end to hostilities between the Government of Liberia, MODEL and LURD;191 (2)
establishing ceasefire monitoring and ensuring the security of senior political and military
leaders; 192 (3) United Nations Chapter VII International Stabilization Force to support the
implementation of the Agreement;
restructuring; 194

(5)

193

(4)

United States support for security sector

establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission; 195

(6)

establishment of a governance reform commission to review the existing program for the
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Promotion of Good Governance in Liberia; 196 (7) authorization for LURD and MODEL to
transform into political parties;197 (8) provision of twenty-four of the seventy-six seats of the
National Transitional Legislative Assembly to members of LURD and MODEL; 198

(9)

allocation of key ministries to warring parties;199 and (10) consideration of recommendations for
general amnesty to all persons and parties engaged or involved in military activities during the
Liberian conflict.200
In form and structure, the CPA resembles Sierra Leone’s Lome Accord. However,
several aspects of the road to the CPA indicate that Liberia’s future might not resemble that of
Sierra Leone’s. The NTGL faces particular challenges due to the conflicts arising as to the
composition of its personnel and its substantive goals as outlined by the CPA.201 Though the
agreement strives to strike a balance between the preexisting government in Liberia, the two
major rebel factions, LURD and MODEL, and “civil society,” it is difficult to see how future
violence will be averted given the division of political power and the partition of control over
Liberia’s resources as outlined by the Agreement.
In general, this agreement strikes only at the manifestations of Liberia’s general sickness:
the culture of impunity. Because the agreement does not strike at the heart of the cause of
insecurity and violence in Liberia-- irresponsible elite control-- there is no hope that this
agreement will render any long lasting solution for Liberia. More specifically, these negotiations
are doomed to fail for at least four reasons. First, the CPA is just one in a line of similar peace
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agreements in Liberia’s history that have failed,202 and there is no indication that this agreement,
especially with so much control designated to rebels, will be any different. Second, the mere fact
of rebel exercise of control over key sectors and resources is an indication that this agreement is
doomed.203 Remember Sierra Leone.204 Third, the possibility of a general amnesty205 for those
who participated in the Liberian wars is the most serious flaw. On the one hand, the amnesty
could be a diplomatic concession to rebels for the sake of maintaining a fragile peace.206 On the
other hand, there is no way for the fragile peace to be maintained when the real perpetrators are
allowed to exist in society without confronting their wrongs in some acceptable way. Finally,
there seems to be no real participation of ordinary Liberians in the negotiation of the peace
agreement under which they are to live.
a. Liberia’s History of Failed Peace Agreements
Signed on August 18, 2003 in the capital of the West African Republic of Ghana, the
CPA comes on the hills of several peace agreements that have been negotiated in Liberia’s recent
history. 207 Between 1990 and 1997, there were thirteen major ECOWAS (the west-African
economic and peace keeping organization) sponsored agreements. 208 With the benefit of
hindsight, it is clear that these initiatives have repeatedly and tragically failed.209 The reasons for
failure are many. Some commentators have suggested that these agreements failed because they
did not meet the needs and interests of Liberia’s warring factions and their leaders, much less
202
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those of the civilian population.210 Others have presented views suggesting that Nigeria’s role in
ECOMOG-- the peacekeeping arm of ECOWAS-- contributed to the failure of these agreements
and prolonged the civil war because it ceased to be “an impartial peacekeeping force and had
turned into just another combatant.”

211

.

Finally, some have suggested that Taylor’s

determination, with the backing of the strongest rebel group, to capture the capital city of
Monrovia and ultimately the presidency could not be averted by any peace process.212 Although
a combination of all these factors contribute to continual failure of Liberia’s peace process, this
last view is of fundamental significance. Again, securing the presidency does not only mean
Taylor’s ascendancy to Head of State; rather, seizing territory means securing commercial
alliances and creating economic opportunities.213
The first set of agreements, including the Banjul peace plan and the Yamoussoukro
agreement, were largely crafted by Liberia’s civil society groups. 214

Their mandate was to

establish a peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, which would supervise a cease-fire and establish an
interim government. During this first round of negotiations, none of the faction leaders were
allowed to join the interim government. 215 The Yamoussoukro agreement differed from the
Banjul peace in that it attempted to balance the Nigerian dominance with more francophone
support through Senegal in the peace negotiation process.216
These first negotiations failed for many reasons, but primarily because there was
absolutely no negotiation with the factions involved.217 At this time Taylor and his forces grew
stronger, and he refused to support the efforts of ECOMOG at peacekeeping if he could not be at
210
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the negotiating table.218 Furthermore, these early accords gave too central a role to the Nigerianrun ECOMOG. The factions would not agree to a peace because they believed that ECOMOG
acted partially during the peace process.219 At this time ECOMOG did not have the support of
other West African countries because of its Nigerian dominance nor did it have the support of
Liberian rebel groups.
In stark contrast to the first round of agreements, the July 1993 Cotonou Accord220 and all
of the peace agreements since have attempted to move away from this ECOWAS-dominated
diplomacy by ringing in the era of power-sharing agreements. 221 ECOWAS leaders and the
United Nations employed the simple reasoning that by accommodating the aspirations of the
armed factions, peace would be achieved at a faster pace.
This plan, like the others, quickly unraveled because an increase in the number of rebel
groups made it increasingly difficult to satisfy all rebel desires.222 Because of the sheer number
of rebel groups at the negotiating table, it became more and more difficult to coordinate a policy
for ending war in Liberia especially, when the rebel groups benefited economically by taking
control over key resources in Liberia-- resources that were often in concentrated geographical
areas that were easy to pirate.223 Seen in this manner, the Cotonou Accord ultimately failed
because the power-sharing regime did not recognize that the factions had vested interests in
maintaining instability rather than moving towards peace.224
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Even after the failure of the Cotonou Accord, in 1994 ECOWAS still believed that the
only way to bring peace to Liberia was to include warlords in the government.225 There was
hope that the Abuja Accords would not present the same failures as the earlier accords for three
reasons. First, Abuja attempted to improve on Cotonou by first assuming that inclusion of the
factions was the first step in direction towards peace and that the next logical step would be to
assure a well-run disarmament program.226 Second, it was assumed that political power could be
exchanged for military peace. Since Taylor’s faction suddenly befriended ECOMOG, it was
thought that the peace process would no longer be threatened.227 Finally, optimism came from
assuming that because the faction fighters had become weary of fighting, evidenced through
voluntary disarmament, there would now be peace.228
The future of the Abuja Accords looked bleak, for several reasons, soon after they went
into effect. Liberia’s security situation remained weak, due to the mobilization of armed groups
in support of rival warlords; 229 following ECOMOG’s departure, Liberia’s borders were
weakened; 230 Taylor’s opponents viewed the state apparatus as a mere extension of his own
personal power;231 and Taylor himself still had the mentality of a warlord.232 The Abuja Accords
were ultimately misguided by way of their indulgent characteristics. A major flaw has been the
increasing willingness to cede power to the factions in the executive arm of the transitional
government without demanding accountability for continual breaches of the agreements
themselves. These same flaws are obvious in Liberia’s latest attempt at peace.
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b. Members of the NTGL: Rebels Turned Politicians
The allocation of seats in the NTGL shows that peace negotiators have caved to the
rebels in a more frightening manner than in Sierra Leone. 233 The outgoing government,
designated in the CPA as one of the three warring parties, currently has five of its ministers in
key government positions, while the two most notorious rebel groups hold a combined seven key
positions in the transitional government: agriculture; commerce and industry; finance; foreign
affairs; justice; labor; and land, mines and energy.234 Other political parties and civil society
organizations hold six seats.235 Yet the main concern of former government members of the
NTGL and members of LURD and MODEL seems to be securing jobs for themselves during the
2005 elections instead of forging a sustainable economic, political, and social future of
Liberia.236 The Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) in Liberia, Jacques
Paul Klein, has reported that Chairman Bryant often acts at the whims of the rebel politicians,
making it difficult for him to address human rights abuses and institutional reform.237
The provision of seats to rebel leaders seems to be a complete windfall for human rights
violators. Law professor Ikechi Mgbeoji condemned the transformation of violent rebel groups
into political parties when the first Liberian civil war ended. 238 First, he argued, the global
community too easily accepts the idea that mere elections are the cornerstone to stability.239
Second, Mgbeoji argues that the metamorphosis of violent rebel groups into political parties at
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the insistence of the international community promotes the culture of coercion and corruption.240
More specifically, this amounts to society’s acceptance of noncompliance with the law,
glorification of the use of arms to gain power, and failure to hold rebels and government leaders
accountable for their criminal conduct and human rights violations against the masses.
Additionally, and possibly more harmfully, this attention to the desires of rebel groups
serves as a decoy that diverts attention from the root cause of insecurity in the first place-- bad
leadership. When the international community continues to focus on rebels and factions, they
miss the opportunity to meaningfully alter post-colonial African leadership.
c. General Amnesty: A Curse Unto Itself
The possibility of general amnesty 241 is one of the most serious flaws of the CPA.
Besides the fact that the granting of a general amnesty is a diplomatic way of encouraging rebels
to participate in the peace process, there are several theoretical and practical problems with this
form of concession.

242

The possibility of a general amnesty in the Liberian context is

problematic legally, politically, and morally. First, the state of the legality of amnesty in the
Liberian context is unclear under international law.243 Given that the determination of whether
to grant amnesty involves an extremely contextual legal decision making-process, there has been
no real determination by policy makers in Liberia that a blanket amnesty was the most
appropriate option for this context. Although it is not decisively clear that international law
prohibits general amnesty for crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and
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other serious violations of international law, it is clear that the United Nations has consistently
maintained the position that amnesty cannot be granted for such acts.244 Additionally, Human
Rights Watch has spoken out against this type of provision, and has that impunity for crimes
under international law must end and that there can be no amnesty for such crimes.245 Second,
amnesty alone is a dangerous formula for peace because of the messages it sends to elites, to
rebels and to society that crimes can be committed and civil wars staged with no consequence for
any of the parties involved. Finally, the blind granting of amnesty does not consider the moral
hazards of dismissing the role of punishment of the main perpetrators. A lesson should have
been learned from the Sierra Leone case. There the United Nations ultimately rejected the idea
that a blanket amnesty could be granted for violations of international law including war crimes
and crimes against humanity.246
d. Participation of Ordinary Liberians
While commentators on the CPA highlight the complex nature of the new role that the
agreement affords for Liberian civil society organizations, there is no indication that the voices
of ordinary Liberians were present in the negotiation of the peace agreement or in its current
interpretation. 247 Instead, the CPA seems to have been born from the negotiations between
ECOWAS, the President of Ghana, and a Nigerian mediator.248 Observers of the peace process
have encouraged what remains of Liberian civil society to improve citizens’ understanding of the
Accra Agreement as a means of engaging the participation of all Liberians in the transition
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process.249 Similarly, the International Center for Transitional Justice has argued that “a rule of
law strategy must be rooted in local conditions, and developed with local civil society.” 250
Furthermore, outreach should move beyond the capital so that members of the larger Liberian
community can begin to have faith in the new systems put in place.251 There is no indication,
however, that organizations have attempted to move beyond Monrovia to teach Liberians about
the peace agreement.
Even the participation of Liberia’s civil society has been criticized. On the one hand,
civil society’s new place in both the legislature and the executive branches takes civil society
beyond their traditional roles as advocates, educators and watchdogs.252 In this way, Liberian
civic leaders can promote democracy in government from within. On the other hand, those civil
society organizations that wish to maintain their independence and traditional watchdog role are
weary of an insider civil society that will be confronted by the realities and temptations of
political life.253
e. Predicting Failure: Sierra Leone Has It Right
Several factors indicate that a negotiated peace with no mechanism for accountability will
fail and that Liberia too should be urged to pursue a Special Court like the one created in Sierra
Leone. I will address this in detail in Part III. First, now that the peace process is well under
way, there have been accusations that the transitional government has let down the Liberian
people through its inability to ensure their security.254 Continuous reports detail lack of every-
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day control over ex-combatants and Liberian citizens in general. 255 Even with a negotiated
settlement, ex-combatants have expressed unwillingness to disarm without the promise of
jobs.

256

Therefore, the reintegration portion of the Disarmament, Reintegration, and

Rehabilitation Program is increasingly a worry given the country’s 85% unemployment rate.257
In Sierra Leone, the disarmament process, with the help of the British, took place at a much
faster pace.258 These incidences highlight that negotiated settlements do not always secure peace
for a fragile, failed state. This occurs because the agreements are not addressing the root issues.
Some will observe that the CPA will establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to
provide a forum to address issues of impunity, as well as an opportunity for victims and
perpetrators of human rights violations to share their experiences. However, this will not extend
far enough to develop a clear picture of the past and to facilitate genuine healing and
reconciliation.
III.
THE JUSTICE APPROACH TO ENDING THE CULTURE OF IMPUNITY
The negotiators of peace in Liberia chose to privilege diplomacy over justice in their
attempt to move Liberia out of its civil war period and into a period of stability. In making this
choice, they have also rejected the use of justice to achieve stability. This choice partly stems
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from fear that punishment will only lead to more violence and instability. 259 The arguments
against using the least punitive mechanisms possible (like negotiated peace agreements similar to
Liberia’s) to address war-torn societies are abundant and forceful; however, these interventions
do not fully consider the historical situation presented in this Comment. In this Part I argue that
targeting the masses or the rebel groups as the site of intervention during transitional periods
misses the point that the elites need the curing, not the masses. Addressing the needs of victims
and focusing too heavily on disarming members of factions ignores the bigger problem, one that
Sierra Leone has recognized.260
In this regard, a Special Court for Liberia would be the best option for Liberia for at least
three reasons. First, Sierra Leone’s approach to transitional justice, with its creation of a Special
Court for Sierra Leone, attests to the importance of using justice to assure accountability. In the
years following Sierra Leone’s civil war and the establishment of the mixed tribunal, there are
signs that the society is beginning to institutionalize the culture of human rights, and the political
scene has moved away from impunity. 261 Second, there is modest empirical evidence that
prosecution of elite actors can play a role in changing the calculation of political actors in
transitional states such as Liberia which could have a tremendous effect on future politics in
Liberia.262 Third, a hybrid court for Liberia would allow it to rebuild its own justice system and
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to address crimes that were specifically Liberian in nature, thus moving the country forward.
Finally, given the fact that there have been prosecutions of war criminals in similar situations in
other countries 263, there seems to be a moral call for justice in the Liberian context as well.
Furthermore, the United States holds a unique relationship with Liberia that will allow it to easily
facilitate this process.264
I first address the example of Sierra Leone and the promise that it represents for the
possibility of a court in Liberia. Next, I briefly survey the challenges to the establishment of a
Special Court for Liberia. These challenges relate to the type of model that should be used
during transition periods to ensure peace and stability and the practical challenges to
implementation and securing legitimacy. These critiques generally insist that the criminal law
model as the primary manner to promote rule of law compliance is not useful. First, these
critiques insist that to achieve peace and reconciliation in society, political carrots such as
amnesty, truth and reconciliation commissions or traditional forms of dispute resolution should
be used. Second, when it is suggested that more punitive mechanisms such as tribunals should
be used, the response is often raised that there is no way to insure legitimacy through externally
influenced trials and that the costs of punitive mechanisms such as trials are prohibitively
expensive.
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Instead of challenging the efficacy of less punitive mechanisms of transitional justice, I
suggest that a Special Court for Liberia would create a hands-on approach to building the respect
for a tradition of rule of law and justice in a country that in theory purports to have such a
tradition but in practice completely lacks such a tradition. The ultimate goal of a Special Court
for Liberia would be to address the ever-rising culture of impunity that continues to damage the
prospects for peace in Liberia.265 My position is that by focusing on the perpetrators of the civil
wars-- those who planned and implemented the civil wars-- a society can begin to raise the cost
of this type of political culture, thus changing the long-term behavior of politicians. In pursuing
this goal of the implementation of the Special Court for Liberia, the CPA would need to be
revised to take into account the concerns expressed herein. I would strongly argue that this type
of structure would need to be conditioned upon the rejection of a blanket amnesty for war crimes
and crimes against humanity as was done in Sierra Leone; this would require an amendment or
modification of the CPA.
A. The Special Court for Sierra Leone: The New Path Forward
Upon the failure of the Lome Accord at the hands of persistent rebels and the desire to go
further than the mandate of the TRC, the people of Sierra Leone, the Sierra Leonean government,
and the United Nations combined efforts to create and to implement the Special Court for Sierra
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Leone [hereinafter, the “SCSL”].266 Though the primary players in the creation of the Special
Court have been the government of Sierra Leone, the United States and the United Nations, the
Special Court has been assisted by local civil society organizations that contribute to the court’s
outreach function. 267 Some would suggest that this strong support amongst both the Sierra
Leonean people and in the United Nations for the court’s establishment has been one of the main
reasons for its perceived success amongst Sierra Leoneans.268
The SCSL is a unique mechanism for war crimes law enforcement.269 The SCSL was
created as an agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone, with the specific mandate
to bring to justice those “who bear the greatest responsibility” for serious violations of
international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law, committed in the territory of Sierra
Leone since November 30, 1996. 270 The Court’s main focus will be to try those who held
leadership and command positions, i.e., those who planned and instigated attacks. 271 The
government and civil society of Sierra Leone have concluded that lower level perpetrators of
human rights violations and victims of these violations will have their opportunity for justice
through Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 272 The SCSL has indicted
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thirteen people for war crimes, including former Liberian president Charles Taylor273 and former
Sierra Leone government minister Hinga Norman.274 The surviving indictees are being charged
with war crimes, crimes against humanity, and serious violations of international humanitarian
law.275
The Special Court is more flexible than a fully international court because the Court can
apply both international law as well as Sierra Leonean law, 276 allowing the Court to address
crimes specific to the Sierra Leonean conflict. Yet the reach of the Special Court is limited to
the national courts of Sierra Leone and does not extend to the courts of third states.277 Unlike
Sierra Leone, the Rwanda [ICTR] and the Yugoslavian [ICTY] Tribunals were mandatory in
nature because the United Nations determined under Chapter VII of the United Nations charter
that the wars in those countries were a threat to international peace and security. 278 The
implications of this distinction will be discussed infra.
The Court has issued a number of precedent-setting decisions on international law,
including a ruling in 2004 that heads of state are not immune from prosecution before an
international court.279 Crimes under Sierra Leonean law are limited to offences relating to the
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abuse of girls and damage to property under two Sierra Leonean statutes.280 This ability of the
Court to decide cases under Sierra Leonean law reinforces Sierra Leone’s rules of law alongside
the international rules that will be applied.
Some would argue that the most pressing issue facing the court relates to its financing
mechanism. The government of Sierra Leone is unable to contribute in any significant manner to
the operational costs of the Special Court, which means that the Court relies primarily on
contributions from non-governmental sources.281 Institutions created by the Security Council,
such as the ICTR and the ICTY, are funded by scaled assessments, in which each country's
contribution is proportionate to its size and wealth.282 However, because the United Nations did
not directly establish by the SCSL, the Sierra Leone court will be financed through voluntary
contributions. One of the major obstacles for funding the Court is its ability to collect the funds
that donor states have pledged.283
Yet it is highly unlikely that the international community will let this effort fail.284 By
the end of 2003, the United States, through its USAID program, provided the Special Court a
total of $15 million to pursue its operations.285 The organization’s rationale for support of the
Court is that the nation’s fragile peace will depend heavily on sustained external support.
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Furthermore, given the United Kingdom’s unique connection to Sierra Leone,286 British aid for
Sierra Leone is more than likely.
The critiques of the SCSL have been offset by its promises. The hope is that trials taking
place in Freetown will send a powerful message to the people of Sierra Leone that justice is
being done within the framework of the rule of law. There are signs that these goals are being
achieved. The special court has trained local attorneys and sent teams to explain legal concepts
to villagers, soldiers, and students.287 Additionally, the simple fact that the SCSL has indicted
Charles Taylor sends the message that Sierra Leone is committed to changing its legal landscape.
B. Dominant Methods of Addressing the Aftermath of Violence, Just as Many
Unanswered Questions and Possibly the Wrong Target: Amnesty, Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions, and Traditional Mechanisms for Peace and Reconciliation
in Liberia
The problem of how many and who to punish, and an ethic of reconciliation and
forgiveness, permeate discourse on international peace and justice.288 Professors Laurel Fletcher
and Martha Minow have considered the question of why countries address past episodes of mass
violence, and the goals they seek to achieve. 289 These goals include: (1) discovering and
publicizing the truth; (2) making a symbolic break with the past; (3) promoting the rule of law
and strengthening democratic institutions; (4) deterrence; (5) punishment of perpetrators; and (6)
healing victims and achieving social reconstruction.290 As part of the discussion on which of
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these goals should be privileged over others, there is a growing debate as to whether trials are
useful in the reconciliation process at all.291
Although I discuss both the utility and the problems with trials in the next section, I offer
first that in arguing for less punitive measures, some scholars and policymakers question the
effectiveness of law in promoting peace in these ruined societies. First, some suggest that
although trials have the potential to be effective and efficient, there is no hard proof that they
actually promote rule of law goals or peace.292 At worst, trials may detract from rule of law
goals because they lead to further instability in the country.293 This is so because trials focus on
punishing instead of bringing about economic justice and political change.

Second, some

suggest that trials as an exclusive means to promoting peace and justice do not deal adequately
with the need for all members of a society to be reconciled. 294 Finally, trials and other
reconstruction efforts are too expensive, considering the amount of infrastructure and training
needed to get them running.295
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In response to the disadvantageous aspects of trials, transitional justice scholars focus
primarily on three types of less punitive mechanisms.296 Scholars have offered alternatives such
as amnesty in exchange for truth and reconciliation, or using traditional courts and other
traditional dispute mechanisms to dispense more quickly with less serious violations. The use of
these mechanisms suggests that, to move from a society of violence and to rehabilitate the
masses, the society and the international community must promote mechanisms that target
society at large instead of individual perpetrators. 297 I address these arguments in turn.
1. The Amnesty as a Transitional Mechanism: Too Many Unanswered Questions
Currently, the CPA calls for the consideration of amnesty for crimes committed during
the civil war in Liberia.298 Amnesty is the decision by which a society decides not to prosecute
the wrongs of a predecessor regime or insurgents during the regime. 299 As an alternative to
punishment, amnesty attempts to assure that transitions will happen peacefully.300 Professors
Jeremy Sarkin and Erin Daly cite three reasons why a transitional government might sanction an
amnesty.301 First, nascent governments may make the political calculation to grant amnesty to
gain the support or acquiescence of outgoing officials.302 Second, amnesty may result from a
calculated conclusion that doing nothing is better than doing anything. 303 Finally, a new
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government might be unable to pursue other methods to reconciliation for lack of political or
economic resources thus causing a de facto amnesty.304
The dominant critique of a general amnesty, as opposed to a limited amnesty, however, is
that it capitulates to past perpetrators and does not honestly attempt to move a country
forward.305 The danger of amnesty, from this perspective, is that it can easily cause a society to
slip into a culture of impunity. 306 Sarkin and Daly argue that this may occur if “amnesty
confirms a lack of accountability and of responsibility—if it denies the wrongfulness of the prior
regime’s actions and, ultimately denies the fact of those actions.”307 Undoubtedly, supporters of
amnesty will point how, in South Africa, the TRC used the promise of amnesty to obtain some
information about past crimes; it is generally believed that the TRC achieved more truth than
would have been possible otherwise.308 I do not challenge this notion here. Yet in South Africa,
the political and social environment was more conducive for amnesty than in countries such as
Sierra Leone and Liberia.
I suggest that a second fatal problem with the granting of a general amnesty is that no
consensus exists on when amnesty should be granted and when it should not. 309 There are
reasons why amnesties work in contexts such as South Africa but might not be as helpful in
countries with a history like Liberia. Even those who argue that amnesty could be a positive
mechanism to achieve societal reconciliation are firm in the suggestion that there are two
requirements that must temper the granting of amnesty. 310 First, amnesty should always be
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individual and not general. 311 Each applicant should submit voluntarily to the terms of the
amnesty and a blanket amnesty should be disfavored. Second, Sarkin and Daly argue that
amnesties should be conditional.312 In other words, there is consensus that amnesty should not
be given away for free or in exchange for a pre-existing duty such as a duty to obey the law. The
CPA in its current form does not suggest a limitation on the application of amnesty.313 For this
reason, this provision of the agreement should not be followed.
2. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: The Wrong Target
The CPA also calls for the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission.314
Truth commissions are institutions established to review an era of systematic violence and to
provide an authoritative account of what happened.315 Amnesty International has indicated that
such a commission may have an important role in establishing the facts and identifying those
responsible for crimes under international law. Nevertheless, it cannot be a substitute for a court
of law to try alleged perpetrators of serious violations of international law.316
In popular culture, the South African TRC is the point of reference for those who espouse
reconciliation and security through forgiveness as the dominant form of transitional justice.317
The South African TRC used the promise of amnesty to obtain information about past crimes to
produce a fuller understanding of the truth of what occurred during the Apartheid Era.318 Martha
Minow suggests that truth commissions might address mass violence in societies better than
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trials because, designed to be a sympathetic forum for survivors wishing to testify, they are a
more therapeutically appropriate model for victims. 319
I do not dispute that TRCs might help victims to cope with the past violence sustained by
their communities. But, aren’t the victims really the wrong target for sustained intervention?
The needs of victims will be positively addressed if the root causes of civil strife are dealt with
through a long-term strategy that addresses impunity in African states and state-sponsored or
state-supported violence against the masses. It simply is not clear how a truth commission can
promote reconciliation in society when the major perpetrators of violence in Liberia are at large
or hold seats in the transitional government. Scholars who focus on TRC effectiveness have left
this tension unexplained. I doubt that governance in Liberia will change when there is no
advantage to do so, i.e. when elites are allowed to escape through the transition cracks because
all of the transition resources are focused on victims. My initial thoughts on why the TRC in
South Africa was so successful boils down to the fact that South Africa was dealing largely with
the problem of societal racism in the form of Apartheid. Apartheid as a system of racism
permeated all aspects of society and effected race relations among all South Africans.320 The
entire country needed the healing effects of the TRC. Liberia is different; not all of Liberia’s
people act in a way to destroy the purpose of the state of Liberia. But the elites in Liberia do.
Additionally, several transitional scholars, including Professors Sarkin and Daly, note
that no quantitative study to assesses the success of truth commissions. 321 Because further
empirical study is needed to test arguments for truth commissions, arguments for alternative
models of transition as well as for trials are weakened. In Sierra Leone, one of the problems that
319
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arose over the possibility of a truth and reconciliation commission was that some individuals
were reluctant to testify to a commission for fear that they would implicate their friends. 322
Furthermore, some civil society organizations have noted that Liberia has not even begun the
process of implementing a well run truth and reconciliation commission like the TRC in Sierra
Leone. 323 Liberia has failed to hold conferences involving the participation of members of
Liberian society in order to ascertain their idea on the need for a commission; this might be
because Liberian civil society, though present, is really weak.

Instead, the transitional

government of Liberia continues to focus exclusively on the needs of rebels-turned-politicians,
despite the fact that many Liberians have expressed the view that they want Charles Taylor to be
brought to justice in some forum.324
3. Traditional Mechanisms of Dispute Resolution: What is Traditional?
Finally, scholars critiquing the state-centered rule of law model promote more grassroots
approaches to addressing communal violence.325 These approaches tend to promote revitalizing
traditional forms of dispute resolution. 326

Some have called this form of reconciliation

“restorative justice”-- a form of justice more characteristic of traditional African
jurisprudence. 327 With this type of justice, the goal is not retribution or punishment, but
“redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships, [and] a seeking to rehabilitate
the victim and the perpetrator . . ..”328
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Professor Jennifer Widner explores the role of local forums in post-conflict transitions.329
She explains that traditional forums for dispute resolution that stress mediation and arbitration
serve as a gap filler for the formal judicial system while lawyers are trained and courthouses are
rebuilt.330 Widner’s main argument for greater reliance on traditional courts is that the state
judiciary can become overburdened if too many cases are referred to them during vulnerable
times.331 Customary and community courts, Widner argues, can establish a foundation for rule
of law reconstruction because they have been effective in resolving ordinary disputes fairly and
quickly.332
In Rwanda, for example, the gacaca, or village courts, have enjoyed a resurgence since
the end of the genocide.333 The Rwandan government decided to use the gacaca courts to deal
with lower-level offenders at a community level as a result of the country’s realization that the
Rwandan justice system could not handle the huge number of genocide cases.334 Those who
promote the gacaca system argue that it will have healing effects for society because it will
provide individuals the chance to discuss the genocide, participate in the creation of justice and a
standard of responsibility for criminal actions, and deal with traumatic events more quickly.335
Still, observers also have several reservations about the gacaca system that highlight
more general concerns about relying on tradition and native customs in forging modern legal
practice.336 First, gacaca was traditionally a dispute settlement mechanism for resolving local
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disputes over family matters, property rights, and other local concerns and may not adapt as a
criminal justice model. 337 Second, no system protects witnesses and victims, monitors the
release of defendants, or ensures that they do not retaliate against their accusers. 338 Finally,
gacaca may not protect the due process rights of the accused.339 More recently, scholars argue
that the gacaca process might actually contribute to the insecurity of all Rwandan citizens in the
future, emphasizing the fact that these courts will accentuate ethnic divides in Rwandan society
because they only try genocide crimes and not war crimes.340 Hutus will be disproportionately
charged with crimes.

These concerns with gacaca only highlight larger concerns about

privileging traditional practices over more modern ones. While traditional practices ought not to
be rejected outright, we must avoid supporting practices simply because they have historical or
traditional roots.341
Turning to Liberia, there has been no suggestion that the Liberian government would be
willing to turn over matters of transitional justice to Liberian traditional courts, even though
indigenous Liberians do have informal dispute settlement mechanisms. 342 Additionally, the
same problems that face the gacaca courts in Rwanda would probably face any traditional court
in Liberia. Furthermore, the cultural context in Liberia is different from that of Rwanda; Liberia
has over sixteen ethnic groups and it is not clear that the people of Liberia would agree upon the
type of dispute mechanism that should be used. Furthermore, there were many instances of
cross-ethnic violence in Liberia, and forcing members of outside ethnic groups to appear before
other ethnic courts might implicate notions of fairness.
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C. In Defense of Trials: Why Punish?
Having articulated the problems with the most dominant forms of transitional justice
mechanisms, I argue that a growing body of evidence indicates that punitive measures such as
trials, though imperfect, can contribute greatly to addressing the problems articulated in the
previous section. I have chosen to discuss the particular contribution that trials offer the Liberian
context because of the pressing need to end the culture of impunity in a country that can be an
example for African states struggling with similar issues of accountability. The central point
here is simple: if the manner in which power is exercised in societies can be changed by
deterring those who wield the most power in society, the ethic of accountability can begin to
permeate the greater political culture. But, first I offer the criticisms of trials.
1. The Modern Critique of the Use of Trials during Transitional Periods
Traditionally, advocates of trials believe that they will help communities rebuild because
they support one or more of the following goals: (1) to discover and publicize the truth of past
atrocities; (2) to punish perpetrators; (3) to respond to the needs of victims; (4) to promote the
rule of law in emerging democracies; and (5) to promote reconciliation.343 These goals are very
similar to those articulated earlier for why societies chose to address past violence in the first
place. In periods of transition, Professor Ruti Teitel explains, law’s role has been to “express the
justice of the successor regime.”344 On Teitel’s view, “trials offer a transitional mechanism for
normative transformation to express public condemnation of aspects of the past, as well as public
legitimation of the new rule of law.345 Trials, in this sense, focus on the individuals responsible
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for wrongdoing. This focus on the individual allows an express disavowal of the predecessor
norms.
Still, the limits of criminal trials in promoting the goal of reconciliation are no secret.
There has been no lack of healthy criticism about the utility of trials.346 Critical scholars suggest
that trials are not always the most productive mechanism for insuring the rule of law and peace
in transitional societies. Fletcher and Weinstein critique the criminal law model as an exclusive
avenue during transitions because they believe that the emphasis on criminal trials overshadows
other means of achieving the goal of anti-impunity for human rights violators.347 Others suggest
that pursing perpetrators will only result in more violence because the security structures in weak
states are not strong enough to support tribunals; 348 or that victims and bystanders are left
without a means to heal because all resources have been spent on the court, in turn creating a
desire for vengeance.349 Although a trial of perpetrators might address goals two through five
above, some scholars do not see how trials can contribute to truth telling or to healing victims.350
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These scholars have constructed a critical discourse on trials that focuses primarily on
their inability to address the needs of victims. For example, Fletcher and Weinstein argue that
the current paradigm punishes only a few select individuals who carried out the most egregious
acts or who commanded others to do so, and neglects to address communal engagement with
mass violence.351
The driving force behind these criticisms is the perception of a lack of evidence of how
trial justice contributes to social reconstruction in the aftermath of mass violence. 352 The
particular concern is that “the theoretical foundation for international criminal trials borrows
heavily from writing developed in a political and legal context in which such proceedings were
mere aspirations and with no empirical data to substantiate the purported benefits of international
trials.” 353 Specifically, Fletcher and Weinstein note the dearth of studies of the effects of
criminal trials on victims, bystanders, and perpetrators and whether these trials can affect societal
beliefs and attitudes.354 Similarly, there is lack of evidence that the receivers of this transitional
justice connect the trials with the establishment of the rule of law.
2. Evidence that Trials Might Have a Positive Effect on Political and Social Change
I have suggested earlier that there are fundamental problems with addressing only the
grievances of victims and rebels when a society moves out of a violent period. These groups are
often the wrong target.

A negotiated peace agreement such as the CPA places too much

emphasis on power sharing with rebel politicians and not enough emphasis on combating the
culture of impunity that leads to the need for these peace agreements in the first place. Similarly,
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the major critiques of trials place too much emphasis on the inability of trials to heal the wounds
of victims355 and not enough emphasis on new evidence that trials targeted at specific individuals
tend to affect the behavior of politicians and can have modest effects on rule of law goals.356
Before discussing recent evidence of the utility of trials, I refute the concern that criminal
prosecutions might actually lead to more violence.
The suggestion that going after perpetrators will only lead to more violence might be
incorrect.357 There is no concrete proof that indictments of high level officials will necessarily
lead to more societal unrest. First, the object of special and international tribunals is to target a
handful of perpetrators, not the combatants on the ground.358 It is unlikely that the security of
Liberians will be threatened by punishing figures like Charles Taylor. Security is an issue when
every person that fought is rounded up and thrown into jail. This is not what I am suggesting
should happen. For example, Hinga Norman (a rebel leader during Sierra Leone’s war) was
indicted by the Special Court of Sierra Leone even though he received a cabinet post when Sierra
Leone’s elected government was restored.359 Yet his indictment did not cause serious breaches
of the Lome Accord by Sierra Leoneans. The concern about fragile peace is sometimes so
overemphasized that the peace negotiation process gives factions too much leverage over the
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post-war reconstruction goals. It might be the case that a strong international presence in the
face of rebels could actually sustain peace.
It is no longer an unproven statement that bringing war criminals to justice can send an
important message that power does not buy immunity from charges for war crimes. 360 The
international community is only now beginning to determine the affects of the ad hoc tribunals
on violence prevention, and the effects of the Sierra Leone court will not be known for years to
come. Now that several years have passed since the Rwanda and the Yugoslavia tribunals,
however, there is some empirical evidence available that prosecution can actually prevent future
atrocities through a process that marginalizes leaders who resort to ethnic appeals. 361 In the
Rwanda and the Yugoslavia contexts, at least, this marginalization has led to the emergence of a
more moderate political rhetoric.362
The work of scholars such as Payam Akhavan demonstrates with empirical evidence that
trials may prevent future atrocities by instilling unconscious inhibitions against violence on
society at large, and cautioning politicians to perform a cost-benefit calculation before
encouraging internationally illegal activities.363 Akhavan argues that individual accountability
for massive crimes is “an essential part of a preventive strategy and, thus, a realistic foundation
for a lasting peace.”364
Akhavan proceeds with the assumption that in liberal societies, the criminal law model
presupposes some moral choice on the part of the perpetrators of criminal acts.365 Yet during
times of mass violence, moral values get so inverted that individuals who are directly responsible
360

Akhavan, supra note 356, at 7 (arguing that stigmatization of criminal conduct may have far-reaching
consequences, promoting postconflict reconciliation and changing the broader rules of international relations and
legitimacy); Ward, supra note 105, at 8.
361
Akhavan, supra note 356.
362
Id. at 7
363
Id.
364
Id. at 9.
365
Id. at 11.

65

Scott
for war crimes are elevated in society to a status akin to national heroes.366 Therefore, when
individuals are encircled in collective hysteria and routine violence, Akhavan posits that these
individuals are not likely to be deterred from committing crimes.367
Faced with how to prevent these abnormal conditions before they occur or reoccur,
Akhavan provides two arguments for targeting the most powerful leaders for punishment.368
First, “where leaders engage in some form of rational cost-benefit calculation, the threat of
punishment can increase the costs of a policy that is criminal under international law.”369 The
assumption here is that leaders would prefer long-term political viability over momentary glory.
Furthermore, Akhavan suggests that international legitimacy is a valuable asset for aspiring
statesmen; the stigmatization of indictment may threaten the attainment of long-term political
power. 370 Therefore, the threat of punishment may persuade specific leaders and potential
perpetrators to adjust their behavior, thus removing “impediments to stability from the political
stage, and provid[ing] an incentive for constructive political behavior.”371
Second, Akhavan’s hope is that punishment for international crimes will instill
“unconscious inhibitions against crime” or “a condition of habitual lawfulness” in society.372
Through punishment of leaders, there might be a “progressive entrenchment of a more lawful
self-conception” among the wider public.373 Through the force of “moral propaganda” from the
implementation of international criminal justice, the international community can change the
rules for the exercise of power.374
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Two examples of how this process might work come from Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In
Yugoslavia, Akhavan describes how the policy of discrediting wartime leaders and the
leadership of the Bosnian Serb Republic (the leadership before and during the Bosnian War) by
the ICTY have allowed new leaders to emerge and to make politically moderate statements that
would have ruined their political future in an earlier context.375 Specifically, politicians in postwar Yugoslavia seem to be distancing themselves from the strong rhetoric of the Serb
Democratic Party to claim a new and more moderate image.376 Part of this strategy is to clean up
the party’s image by separating it from Radovan Karadzic, its founder and one of the leaders
indicted by the ICTY; since the creation of the tribunal, Karadzic has become a liability to the
party. 377 Akhavan argues that the international community’s policy of using the ICTY as a
mechanism to dispose of indicted leaders has contributed to post-conflict peace building by
“creating incentives for political parties to behave in a more conciliatory manner.”378
Similarly, Akhavan has evidence that the ICTR has made a modest contribution to postconflict peace building by discrediting and incapacitating the remnants of the former genocidaire
government in Rwanda.379 As in Yugoslavia, the ICTR, alongside the national criminal justice
system in Rwanda seems to have exercised a moderating influence in the post-conflict peacebuilding process in Rwanda.380 The new Tutsi government in Rwanda has been discouraged
from sanctioning Tutsi revenge killings against Hutu, since the interest of the Tutsi government
is served by distinguishing itself from the previous Hutu rulers of Rwanda. 381 Furthermore,
without the ICTR it would have been easier for the Interahamwe (Hutu forces that carried out the
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genocide) to gain support and to launch a campaign against the successor government. 382
Instead, Akhavan argues that channeling the desire for vengeance into legal process has
mitigated the severity of retaliatory abuses.383 Finally, the ICTR may prove to have a special
positive effect: the gradual internationalization of accountability in the African continent.384
In the following subsection I apply Akhavan’s ideas to an argument for a Special Court
for Liberia.
D. Lessons from Colonialism, Post- Colonialism: Preliminary Justification for A Special
Court for Liberia
Having addressed several transitional justice mechanisms and defended the use of trials
to promote accountability, here, I argue that a criminal trial will be of special significance to
Liberia for three reasons. First, a trial will focus on elite-sponsored violence, beginning the
process of ending the culture of impunity.385 As a cautionary note, the ability to amend the CPA
in such a way as to be non-threatening to those who are likely to cause violence should allay
frustrations over whether the push for a trial will foster instability in Liberia. Second, promoting
a special court for Liberia would help crimes specific to the Liberian context and rebuild
Liberia’s national courts. Finally, the international community has a duty to commit such
resources to places like Liberia because similar investment has been committed to Sierra Leone,
a country very similar to Liberia and to other countries.386
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1. Ending the Culture of Impunity while Maintaining a Fragile Peace: Changing the
Calculation of Liberian Politicians
Applying the analysis above to the Liberian context and recognizing that Liberian
politicians have historically acted with a complete disregard of the needs of Liberian people,
Liberia is a ripe setting to enforce an ethic of accountability. Having Taylor at large will not
prove helpful for Liberia’s transitional government, given his ability to dictate the movement of
Liberian affairs even while in exile.387 As it stands, the current situation in Liberia sends a
message that it is acceptable to rule through criminal behavior in Liberia.388 More specifically,
in the African political context, holding those most responsible is necessary because of the nature
of African politics since decolonization, a nature firmly rooted in the culture of impunity.389
Remedying harmful aspects of the colonial legacy in African states will do a great deal to
increase the legitimacy of African states in the eyes of the international community.
Although there is growing critique of the state-centered method (rule of law orthodoxy)
by which the international community addresses the goal of encouraging respect for the rule of
law 390 , I posit that trials can contribute to achieving rule of law in a given society. In the
Liberian context, courts can play a crucial role in the country’s transformation to a real rule of
387
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law system because their very presence symbolizes a break from the past political arrangement.
Still, certain principles can be applied in any context. Litigation in the courts allows access to
the new democracy and as Professor Ruti Teitel argues, courts can be the guardians of the new
constitutional order. 391 In this way, “the law expresses new norms and does the work of
reconstruction.” 392 Therefore, law does the work of exposing and delegitimizing the value
system associated with past rule. In a similar vein, Jamie O’Connell argues that transforming a
political system into one that functions democratically requires a citizenry that holds government
officials accountable.393 In countries such as Sierra Leone or Liberia, where ordinary people
have become accustomed to abuses by the powerful, internationally-supported courts and truth
commissions may begin to undermine this culture of impunity. 394 With the proper level of
support, a hybrid tribunal reinforced by Liberian national courts might serve the positive role of
constructing and enforcing established human rights principles and create and enforce new rules
specific to the Liberian context. This is so because the judiciary will play a constructivist role
that the transitional government cannot play because of its political weakness.
Sadly, however, few sources have dealt seriously with the thought of accountability for
those who have caused a continual state of instability for Liberians. In fact, plenty of critiques
aim at the type of intervention sought here. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, for example, executive
secretary of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), rejects the notion of
a tribunal like Sierra Leone’s for Liberia.395 He explains that “if it’s externally induced, the
system may not be able to withstand the consequences.” 396 In Africa, Chambas explains,
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“community bonds, loyalty to individuals are still strong.

If one rushes with certain high

principles, it certainly won’t lead to stability.”397 Others suggest that Liberians would really
prefer to leave these tragic events behind them and move on.398
Some organizations working in Liberia have indicated that “there is little expectation that
any of those who have committed gross human rights violations, engaged in widespread
corruption or looted government coffers in the past will ever be called to account.”399 To date,
commentators on the situation in Liberia have mentioned in only a general way one of three
possible avenues Liberia might pursue for justice: referral of the issue to the Special Court for
Sierra Leone;400 placing transitional justice for war crimes under authority of the International
Criminal Court;401 or creating a court for Liberia.402 These commentators and policymakers have
not fully explored the real possibility of any of these avenues.
The predominant current moving against the implementation of judicial mechanisms to
achieve justice in Liberia is that “the situation on the ground is by all counts still very precarious
. . . .”403 This theme of the “fragile peace” has completely frozen the possibility of justice for
Liberians by placing the future of the country at the whims of the rebels.
Yet this fear to move forward with a special court for Liberia is largely unfounded given
the fact of Sierra Leone. Policymakers have only dealt with the issue of creating a special court
for Liberia (to the exclusion of the extension of jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
or referral of the matter to the International Criminal Court) in a cursory manner because the
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international community does not know the ultimate effectiveness that Sierra Leone’s court will
have on peace in that country.404
In theory, the structure of a special court for Liberia would be similar to the one
established in Sierra Leone. Subject matter, temporal and personal jurisdiction of the court and
selection of judges would follow the Sierra Leone framework. Funding could come either from
assessed contributions or from part of the large reconstruction budget already allocated to
Liberia.

In February of 2004, a total of $520 million was pledged at Liberia’s donor’s

conference, but, as of late October 2004, the transition government only received $354
million.405 The United States pledged $200 million of this total.406
Some might argue that extending the jurisdiction of the SCSL is the simplest and fastest
method of insuring justice for perpetrators of the most serious violations of crimes committed
during the Liberian crisis; many of the actors that led the campaigns of violence operate in and
out of the Mano River region, encompassing Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. This would
require the United Nations to grant the SCSL Chapter VII authority, the result being that the
Court would have the authority to require Nigeria to turn over Charles Taylor. Furthermore,
because the infrastructure is already in place, additional funding for structures is unnecessary.407
There would only be a slight increase in the number of indictees, because the charge of the court
is to prosecute only those most responsible. Finally, the NTGL is not presently politically or
financially ready to install its own courts. These arguments would suggest that the extension of
jurisdiction might be the only real way to achieve some sense of justice.
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Yet the reality is that extension of the jurisdiction of the Sierra Leone Court to cover the
Liberian civil war would not be the most productive option for Liberia. Jacques Klein suggested
that the expansion of the jurisdiction of the SCSL to cover Liberia would not be feasible for both
legal and practical reasons.408 For example, the court is special to Sierra Leone’s needs in that
Sierra Leonean law will be applied in some circumstances.409 Also, the subject matter of the
contract only concerns crimes committed during the Sierra Leonean civil war, not those crimes
committed during either of the Liberian crises. 410 Furthermore, one lesson from the ad hoc
tribunals has been the utter importance of local tribunals that truly serve the citizens of the
country where the crimes were committed.411 Those who have evaluated the effectiveness of the
Rwanda tribunal, in Arusha, Tanzania, emphasize the myriad issues that arise with this
structure.412 For example, a noted lack of connection between the Rwandan people and court
proceedings exists because the ICTR has not adequately publicized their proceedings. 413
Furthermore, the trial’s location in Arusha has produced witness coordination difficulties. 414
Crucially, Liberia must face its past on its own turf.
More fundamental issues face the idea of referring the Liberia crisis to the International
Criminal Court. First, and most importantly, only crimes committed after the entry into force of
the Rome Statute (1 July 2002) can be brought before the ICC.415 The crimes committed in
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Liberia occurred well before 2002, even though some continued into 2003. 416 With such a
limited temporal jurisdiction, some of the perpetrators of the Liberian civil war could not be
reached through the ICC. Second, the states most likely to commit themselves to scrutiny are
those least likely to violate human rights.417 Louise Arbour and Morten Bergsmo have argued
that “the restrictive jurisdictional regime of the ICC Statute will make effective investigation and
prosecution by the Court very difficult as long as a situation has not been referred by the Security
Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.”418 Although Liberia has recently ratified the
Rome Statute, there is no indication that it would submit its citizens to be tried.419 Finally, if
Liberia were to submit to the ICC it could possibly lose the support of the United States,
considering that the United States does not support the ICC.420
2. Addressing Crimes Specific to the Liberian Context and Rebuilding Liberia’s National
Courts
A hybrid tribunal would have the additional potential to influence the pace of law reform
in the national courts of Liberia and assist in rebuilding Liberia’s own justice system. Taking the
second idea first, policy makers support the idea that courts applying both international and
national law can help a country rebuild its own justice system and to reform its laws.421 Because
courts like the SCSL are in-country, diplomats hope the court's location will facilitate the
diffusion of legal knowledge from international to local judicial officials, which will assist in
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rebuilding the country’s own national judicial system.422 If a hybrid court is successful, the host
country’s legal system can learn from its effectiveness and efficiency.
Using the case of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the International Center for
Transitional Justice identified the three activities that it hopes will take place: (1) substantive
law reform (drafting of new legislation to update old laws and bringing Sierra Leonean law into
compliance with its international legal obligations), (2) professional development (development
of relationships between international legal expertise and local legal professionals), and (3)
raising awareness of the court as exemplary of an independent and well-functioning criminal
court (introducing the concept of the court and creating awareness of legal processes to
audiences outside of Freetown, the capital).423 From these goals, policy makers in Sierra Leone
hope to see updated and improved laws; availability of skills training and development
opportunities for judges, lawyers, investigators, court administrators, and prison guards; and,
finally, an increased public awareness and dialogue about criminal processes and the role they
fulfill in post-conflict societies.424
A special tribunal might also help modernize potentially destructive cultural values.
Most importantly, using law to characterize certain acts as criminal can legitimize certain legal
values and criminalize others. Criminalization, Kenneth Abbot argues, supports the penetration
of international norms into national legal systems.425 Abbott argues that prosecutions of certain
prominent figures might begin to change people’s perceptions of statehood and citizenship:
“international legal institutions can be “teachers of norms,” shaping how governments and
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citizens perceive particular conduct.”426 Thus, citizens would be encouraged to reshape their
view of governance and the duties of states and citizens.
This criminalization process has been evident in movements to eradicate societies of
harmful traditional practices. Still, the concern that arises when considering changing cultural
values is whether societies can transform harmful practices without destroying the culture itself.
These questions were raised when Asian and African societies began to combat the widely
known practice of female genital mutilation.427 As soon as civil society groups in these countries
began to speak out against these practices and western countries began to publicize the wrongs of
female genital mutilation, countries began to pass legislation or to ban the practice. 428 For
example, Côte d’Ivoire promised the United Nations in 1991 to use its existing criminal code to
prohibit the practice and passed a law prohibiting it in 1998.429 In Sierra Leone, civil society
groups hope that the Special Court will have an impact on death penalty law in Sierra Leone.430
Though movements to change harmful traditional practices have been criticized by arguments
that espouse theories of cultural relativism, 431 these theories are problematic and can be just as
paternalistic as those calling for the elimination of harmful cultural practices.
One possible target area for a Special Court for Liberia is how Liberian warlords,
including Charles Taylor, sanctioned the use of traditional belief in witchcraft and secret
societies to further ritual killings. Sierra Leonean and other supporters of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone have credited the effort to address specific Sierra Leonean crimes for the way that
426
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the court will help criminalize acts that once appeared legitimate to the Sierra Leonean
society.432 The violence that occurred in Liberia took on a religious nature where murders were
of a particular brutal and utterly unexplainable nature.433 Secret religious societies were a part of
Liberian societies well before the coming of the Americo-Liberians in the 1800s. 434 These
ritualistic societies participated in ritual murder, provoking fear in both Americans and Liberians.
Yet, over time, and upon realizing that this form of traditional religion could not be eradicated
from society, Americo-Liberians and other politicians adopted these practices too.435 Presidents
in Liberia consistently used religion as a way to justify certain public acts and to gain support of
the leaders of the religious sects;436 the Doe regime condoned the use of religion as a tool for
murder.437 Charles Taylor did the same.438 A special court for Liberia would be a fertile site to
address these aspects of Liberian society because the Liberian national justice system does not
have the capacity to address these aspects of Liberian society on its own.
3. The Role of International Involvement and Equal Attention to Crises of Similar Impact
Finally, arguments for promoting justice in Liberia extend beyond the simple notion that
justice can contribute to ending the culture of impunity and the promotion of law reform in
African states. Given the similarity between the conflicts in Sierra Leone and in Liberia, some
type of court must be established simply because these conflicts deserve equal treatment by the
international community. I devoted much of this Comment to describing the history of Sierra
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Leone and Liberia and their conflict and post-conflict situations. This recounting is necessary to
show the clear similarities and patterns in these conflicts. Yet, despite the similarities, the UN
has pushed for a court in Sierra Leone but has sanctioned lawlessness in Liberia.
Arguably, the United Nations’ inconsistent application of its Chapter VII powers in
deploying Humanitarian Intervention missions throughout the world also evidences this
policy.439 Scholars have noted that interventions are not evenly deployed between oppressed
white populations on the European continent and oppressed brown populations on other
continents.440 The possible effect of this failure to commit to African crises in general and to the
Liberian crisis in particular may be the primary hindrance to establishing a lasting peace.441
These same scholars suggest that, if the United Nations would establish a consistent
approach to humanitarian intervention-- an approach grounded in precedent-- it could solidify its
legitimacy in the international community.442 Currently, inconsistent application of international
policy sends the message that deviance in Africa will be more acceptable than deviant behavior
in other conflict areas.443 For Liberia in particular, failure to demand accountability will send a
mixed message to the states in the entire Mano River region; in this area of Africa where the
conflicts have similar root causes and perpetrators operate across borders, violence will be
sanctioned in some countries but not others.
Again, I do not claim that setting up Special Courts will be the answer for each
transitional context. In Liberia, however, the context is ripe for this type of intervention. The
Peace Agreement process in Liberia consistently fails and consistently evades the basic problems
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of elite power in Liberia. 444 Even today, with the new peace agreement, the transitional
government fails to prevent the spread of corruption and fiscal mismanagement.445 In fact, the
transitional government, comprised of rebels-turned-politicians and wealth-opportunity-seeking
politicians, takes advantage of the absence of opposition and the ambiguity of the CPA to endow
itselfwith powers beyond those granted in the Agreement.446 But this is nothing new in Liberia.
These crimes of impunity can be prosecuted through the process of an internationally
supervised justice system. The special court system recommended here would be a first step in
acknowledging that Liberian leaders cannot continue to rule over Liberia without considering the
needs of the Liberian people. It is high time that the international community recognizes and
defends the notion that there are limits to the exercise of state sovereignty. Specifically, when a
state can no longer function as a state because its overseers are the same actors who continuously
act against the state’s very existence, the international community must demand that those state
actors be held accountable for their acts. None of the non-punitive mechanisms of transitional
justice address these issues of state-sponsored violence, nor does a peace agreement that calls for
power sharing with the same actors who benefit from state decay and forgiveness of the crimes
they commit.
E. Ensuring Legitimacy through a Strong U.S. Commitment to Liberia
I have argued that Liberia’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement is less than ideal because it
hands over the Liberian state to rebel leaders through a blanket amnesty and refuses to confront
Liberia’s culture of impunity. In the spirit of optimism, however, Liberia still has a chance to
redirect its efforts. Liberia has failed, but it can recover with sufficient political will and targeted
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and well-funded external aid.447 Rotberg suggests that a major power can play a key role in
revitalizing a failed state in any of the following ways:

providing security, developing a

rudimentary police force, training local officials across bureaucratic departments, and
regularizing the local economies.448 It will not be enough, however, for a major power to be
present to merely band-aid the problems of these countries. Ensuring long-term peace, security
and stability will require keeping in mind the long-term needs of these countries.

Most

importantly, a guarantor can help maintain security throughout the country.
The United States has a duty to encourage Liberia, like Sierra Leone, to take the extra
step to prosecute the individuals most responsible for atrocities in Liberia as a first step on the
road to ending the culture of impunity in Liberia. The United States has reason grounded in
history and diplomacy to commit itself to lending a hand to Liberia.
The United States’ decision whether to commit to ensuring a stable future for Liberia is
important because it will determine whether a Special Tribunal could ever be realistically
implemented and whether Liberians would perceive it as a legitimate mechanism. If the United
States becomes involved in Liberia in a dedicated way, just as the British have involved
themselves in Sierra Leone, the possibility for justice could be real. The presence of a powerful
United States would ensure financial backing for the court, and with enough troops on the
ground, the security issue posed by the rebels would be resolved. Furthermore, Liberians have
expressed the need for U.S. commitment, more so than most African nations. 449 O’Connell
echoes this view when she argues that an international peacekeeping and reconstruction mission
in Liberia, similar to those in Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire under the United Kingdom’s and
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France’s leaderships would seal the comprehensive effort to end war in West Africa.450 In fact,
O’Connell argues that the United States is the only country that can end the war for good in
Liberia because of the unique respect that the United States commands in Liberia.451 One way to
ensure peaceful implementation of a court is through the assurance of adequate additional
peacekeeping forces. However, the number of American peacekeepers in Liberia is currently
inadequate to maintain the fragile peace.452
The United States has continued to play an ambivalent and undecided role in Liberia. For
example, in the summer of 2003-when the international community was begging Charles Taylor
to leave Liberia so that some type of peace could be achieved-U.S. and African newspapers had
different accounts of how the United States should intervene in the Liberia crisis.453 Liberians
saw clear reasons for a strong U.S. intervention, while official American policy on Liberia
remained unclear throughout Liberia’s war. After a small deployment of troops to Liberia,
nothing more was heard of the United States’ plans for its future relationship with Africa’s oldest
republic, despite how at other times in US-Liberia relations, the U.S. has vowed to remain a
close ally to Liberia.454
American newspapers caught on and understood that unequal policies were being applied
between Sierra Leone and Liberia.455 The fate of Liberia has been a direct product of Liberia's
peculiar history.

As explained above, the British took the lead in corralling international

intervention for Sierra Leone, its former colony.456 The French did the same for Cote d’Ivoire.457
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For nearly 150 years, Liberia remained a virtual American colony, and during the Cold War it
ranked among Washington’s most useful allies.458 But the United States has never recognized
itself as an imperial power, let alone a colonial one despite clear historical evidence attesting to
the fact.459
Whether it desires to admit it or not, the United States has a historic connection to the
Liberian nation. The United States is constantly reminded of this relationship by the Liberian
people and by members of the United States Congress, especially African-American members.460
Liberian heads of state clearly and continuallyhave availed themselves of the unique historic fact
that Liberia was an experiment in U.S. repatriation policy. 461 Furthermore, Liberian people
remained hopeful towards the end of the civil war that the United States would intervene on their
behalf.462 This hope persisted as civil society groups in Liberia depended on the United States to
play the lead role in intervention during Liberia’s transition period.463 Rebels in Liberia have
even commented that they more willing lay down their arms if the United States asked them.464
Part of the Liberian people’s willingness to respect the force of the United States stems from the
idea that the United States helped create the modern Liberian state. 465 These feelings and
rationale for U.S. involvement have been echoed by some in the United States.466
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Despite the fact that some see the obvious role that the United States could and should
play in Liberia, the official voice of U.S. policy in Liberia is ambivalent. On the one hand,
members of the U.S. Department of State have stated clearly that the United States must play the
lead in humanitarian assistance in Liberia.467 During a recent hearing on U.S. policy toward
Liberia, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Walter Kansteiner stressed that America
is willing to put American “boots on the ground” in Liberia, that it would project force when
necessary, and that it would participate in diplomatic negotiation with rebel groups and tough
governments.468 Kansteiner also acknowledged that security is key to Liberia’s transition and
that ECOWAS was providing the forces to secure Liberia.469
On the other hand, President Bush’s policy in Liberia at the end of the war was to merely
lend support to ECOWAS under certain conditions: “the departure of Charles Taylor from office
and from Liberia, a cease-fire between rebel groups and Liberian government forces, and the
firm commitment by West African countries to provide leadership and the bulk of the troops for
any peacekeeping effort.” 470 The result of Bush’s policy was ECOWAS’ deployment of
ECOMIL (Ecowas military mission to Liberia) instead of U.S. troops on the ground.471 In June
2003, the Department of State sent 1,800 personnel offshore Liberia to assist if needed in
securing the U.S. Embassy and evacuating Americans and foreign nationals due to the threat
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posed by rebels.472 The largest contingency of American “boots on the ground” in Liberia was
never more than the offshore, 2,100-person U.S.S. Iwo Jima Amphibious Readiness Group.473
African-American members of Congress have continually highlighted the policy of the
United States in refusing to deploy troops on the ground in Liberia despite United States’
economic, military, and political interests in Liberia since the beginning of 1822.474 They have
often suggested that the United States has two policies-an Iraq policy and a Liberia (Africa)
policy.475
I highlight the tensions in U.S. policy toward Liberia for several reasons, but primarily as
a call to the United States to live up to its history in Liberia. After all, Liberia is a part of
America’s slave history. There are other important reasons, however. First, U.S. policy needs to
be clarified. It is clear that U.S. policy is inconsistent and that members of Congress and other
branches of the U.S. government have wildly divergent views on how the United States should
relate to Liberia. 476 Second, the disparity in U.S. policy in different countries should be
recognized: for example, the United States gives freely to development programs in Iraq but
takes a blind stance in Liberia. 477 Whereas the international community seems to be firmly
dedicated to peace in Sierra Leone-- maintaining at least 13,000 U.N. peacekeeping troops to
ensure the security of the Sierra Leonean people as the government there tries to implement their
various transitional justice mechanisms-- there is no equal commitment to Liberia.478 In Sierra
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Leone, just as in colonial times, and after Sierra Leone’s independence, the British have
remained to aid the government in an advisory capacity. 479 Yet, Liberia finds itself in a
precarious position with no superpower on which to lean because of its history of no official
colonization.
Contrary to popular opinion, the involvement of the United States in Liberia would not
create huge costs for the United States. Jamie O’Connell, law clerk to the Honorable James R.
Browning, argues that U.S. leadership in the reconstruction of Liberia might actually lead to
some political gains.480 O’Connell argues that U.S. leadership in Liberia would counter the view
that the “U[.]S[.] shirks its international responsibilities.”481 O’Connell ultimately argues that a
U.S. intervention in Liberia would require only modest military, economic, and political
resources. 482

This would cost about $200 million per year for the first five years of

reconstruction, and perhaps $100 million per year thereafter for 10 years-$1.5 billion over ten
years.483 To get a sense of how small these figures are, O’Connell observes that the United
States is spending $18.6 billion on reconstruction in Iraq, roughly $480 billion on defense and
homeland security in 2004 and $5.4 trillion dollars from 2004 to 2013.484
In sum, sustainable nationbuilding demands more than a quick fix. It requires a longterm commitment by outsiders to building capacities, strengthening security, and developing
human resources. The uncomfortable but necessary lesson from Liberia’s partially effective
attempts at rebuilding the Liberian state is that the revival of failed states will prove more
successful if a regional or international organization or superpower takes charge of oversight and
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financial support of the process, and only gradually relinquishing authority to a transitional
administration.485
CONCLUSION
Liberia’s civil war is officially over, yet the war criminals are free and some are even
helping run the transitional government under CPA authority.

Meanwhile, Charles Taylor

relaxes in Nigeria’s resort city of Calabar. Sierra Leone’s brave step to implement the Special
Court for Sierra Leone is commendable because it signals a desire to begin the transition to rule
of law and the end of rule by impunity. Sierra Leone can be a model for Liberia. It goes without
saying that tribunals are not and should not be a substitute for early global intervention.
Legal mechanisms do have their limits and cannot function alone. An effective atrocities
regime must include institutions for monitoring abuses, conflict avoidance measures, sustainable
peace, protection of minority rights, election supervision, and other functions. 486

Legal

mechanisms will not work without strong political mechanisms and economic support to combat
Africa’s post-colonial weak state syndrome.487 Still, by revisiting the colonial period and the
growth of the post-colonial African political ruling style, we can see the growth of a culture of
impunity. Rule by African elites without answering to their own people has directly caused a
failure of their states.
Liberia has become the quintessential example of an African failed state. My goal has
been to show that if the intervention of the transitional government of Liberia and the
international community is at the level of the exercise of elite power instead of at the level of
reconciliation among the masses (which is where the Comprehensive Peace Agreement focuses
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its energies)-through the use of punitive mechanisms such as prosecution in a hybrid court of
law, Liberia can begin to end the culture of impunity and ring in a sustainable peace.
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